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TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTALJHEALTH TENSION
AT THE

WTO

The protests in Seattle and Genoa embody the growing controversy surrounding the World Trade Organization (WTO). The popular protest, which is echoed
in the academic literature, centers on the tension between the free trade commitment of the General Agreement on the Tariffs and Trade (GATT)' and domestic
policies regarding such matters as environmental, health, consumer, and labor
protection. The WTO and its related dispute resolution bodies have increasingly
been confronted with challenges by importing trade partners claiming that
environmental and health regulations violate multilateral international trade
commitments. In a series of cases adjudicated by early GATT panels (pre-1995),
and the newly formed WTO dispute settlement bodies (post-1995), an emerging
jurisprudence has developed a framework for resolving such conflicts. 2
In this article we illustrate how this jurisprudential framework, and the cases
that comprise it, articulate and apply an anti-discrimination norm that pervades
the GATT. In applying the GATT's anti-discrimination norm, the WTO's jurisprudence strikes a balance between "free trade" and its sovereign members' pursuit
1. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-Il, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
2. Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS IO/R37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Thai-Cigarettes]; United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from
Mexico, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991-92), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter
Tuna !]; GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (not adopted) (June
16, 1994 ) [hereinafter Tuna II]; Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WTIDS2/AB/R, (Apr. 26, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline]; Report of the
Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R
(Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp I]; Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition on
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW, (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp II]; WTO Report
of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTJDS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Meat Hormones]; Report of the Appellate Body, European
Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001) [hereinafter Asbestos].
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of non-trade interests, some of which openly conflict with liberalized trade
practices. This balancing accords with the fundamental structure of the GATT as
a "negative integration" treaty, the character of which necessarily constrains the
WTO's ability to undermine the sovereign policy choices of its contracting
parties, particularly when those policy choices implicate public interest regarding
values such as environmental and public health protection. If properly articulated
and applied, we argue, the anti-discrimination jurisprudence of the WTO will
foster the trade interests that underlie the GATT up to the point where the WTO
could no longer liberalize trade without illegitimately infringing on sovereign
rights.
The core aim of the GATT is to eliminate barriers to the free movement of
goods across national borders. Its objective is to permit contracting States to
specialize in areas where they have a comparative advantage in the production of
certain goods (from such things as low wages, technological gains, lax regulation, and natural resources endowments). Further, the GATT aims to encourage
trade in those goods free of internal taxation or regulation that burdens that
advantage in a discriminatory fashion. The GATT accomplishes this goal through
three core disciplines: the gradual reduction of tariffs; the national treatment
discipline that prohibits parties to the GATT from imposing less favorable
taxation or regulatory treatment on foreign products than on similarly situated
domestic products; and the ban on quotas and like measures.3 The national
treatment discipline, at its core, prevents trading nations from imposing, through
discriminatory internal taxation or regulation, an artificial economic burden on
foreign goods functionally equivalent to that which a tariff would create. The ban
on quotas accomplishes a similar goal in that it prevents countries from achieving
through quantitative restrictions barriers to trade that achieve the same economic
result as a tariff would. In addition, both the national treatment and the quota
disciplines ensure that the only burdens on trade will be in the form of tariffs,
which have the merit of being transparent and easily identifiable in rounds of
negotiations aimed at further liberalizing world trade.
Domestic regulations that violate the trade rules on national treatment or
quotas may serve no legitimate purpose other than imposing a higher economic
burden on the foreign product.4 In the CanadianPeriodicalscase, for example,
Canada's imposition of a steep tax on U.S. magazines was designed to make it
unprofitable to publish special edition periodicals aimed at the Canadian market,
thereby protecting the advertising revenues for Canadian publications. Similarly,

3. GATT arts. 1,111,XI.
4. Report of the Appellate Body, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS3 I/AB/R (June
23, 1997) [hereinafter CanadianPeriodicals];GATT Dispute Panel Report on Japanese Measures on Imports of
Leather, GATT B.I.S.D. (3 1st Supp.) at 94 (May 15, 1984), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispu e/gt47dse.htm [hereinafter Leather Products]; Report of Panel, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and
Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages (Nov. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Vodka/Shochu].
HeinOnline -- 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 635 2002-2003

THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 15:633

in the Vodka/Shochu case, Japan imposed a higher internal tax on vodka than on
comparable domestic liquor for no apparent reason other than sheltering the
domestic product from foreign competition. So too in the Leather Productscase,
Japan restricted the import of certain leather products in order to protect the local
industry. The WTO ruled that each of these regulations violated the national
treatment rules established in the GATT because they seemed to be aimed at
economic protectionism, the very barrier that GATT is committed to eradicating.5
The tension between the GATT's trade goals and various domestic policies
arises most conspicuously with respect to regulations, internal taxation, or import
restrictions that serve an environmental or public health purpose, all the while
implicating the free trade objectives of the national treatment or quota requirements of the GATT. The express purpose of these laws is to protect the health of
the regulating country's citizens, or the environment or natural resources within
or outside the country's borders. At the same time, though, these laws have the
effect, if not the intent, of giving domestic producers of goods or domestic goods
a trade advantage. A particular measure may, for example, restrict the import of
products that are deemed to harm the environment, and thus constitute a quota.
Another measure may impose additional burdens on foreign producers because
of their perceived likelihood of violating domestic environmental or health
norms. Alternatively, a measure may simply establish a standard which, when
applied, has a disparate impact on foreign producers as compared to their
domestic counterparts (who have already internalized the regulatory requirements in their domestic production, or whose products, unlike the foreign
products, have immovable features that comply with the applicable standards).
The question posed by an increasing number of challenges to these laws is:
5. Aside from the economic protectionism goals of the measures at issue, in each of these cases, the WTO
rejected the countries' defense of these regulations as necessary to protect their culture. As Joel Paul
demonstrates, the contracting parties in these cases were asserting essentially a cultural exception argument to
GATT, which is not explicitly contained in one of the GATT exceptions in Article XX. See Joel Richard Paul,
Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, MICH. J. INT'L L. 40-54 (Fall 2000). In the Canadian Periodicals

case, Canada argued that the United States and Canadian magazines were not "like" or similar products for
purposes of the national treatment rules. Magazines, unlike other products subject to open trade, were intended
for intellectual or cultural consumption, and as such when compared with the imported U.S. magazines were not
"like products" and thus could be treated differently in the Canadian market. Canadian Periodicals, supra note
4, at 3.61-63.
Similarly, Japan argued in the Leather Products case that it was protecting an oppressed minority group,
which was historically restricted to certain occupations like leather production, by imposing certain quotas on
leather imports. Japan argued that without the quotas, this cultural group's leather industry would collapse
causing severe social and economic dislocation to this oppressed community and destruction of its traditional
culture. The tribunal, however, rejected the notion that internal discrimination would justify a measure that
otherwise constitutes prohibited economic protectionism. Leather Products, supra note 4, at 21-22.
Japan defended its differential liquor tax system in the Vodka/Shochu case, in which lower tax rates applied to
traditional Japanese drinks, by arguing that because certain distilled liquors were traditional they were not
"like" or "directly competitive" products with European liquors. Vodka/Shochu, supra note 4, at 310. The WTO
panels and Appellate Body rejected these cultural arguments in each case as a disguised form of economic
protectionism.
HeinOnline -- 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 636 2002-2003
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when can the WTO find policies protecting the public interest violative of
GATT's trade-commitment (like environmental and public health protection)?
Another way of asking this question is: how much can the WTO intervene in a
member country's legislative or regulatory processes and second-guess its
substantive policy choices in the interest of promoting free trade?
To understand the contours of the tension between free trade and disputes over
environmental and public health regulation, consider the following scenario.
Imagine that a developing country, country A, suspends patent rights for AIDS
drugs to permit the production of cheap drugs to combat the terrible pandemic.
Foreign manufacturers hold all the monopoly patent rights on the AIDS drugs
from country B, a wealthy industrialized nation. Country A has a nascent
domestic pharmaceutical industry which has the capacity to produce the drugs,
but needs government intervention to do so without infringing on the patent
rights of the country B manufacturers. The domestic industry is very much
supportive of this legislative action and indeed lobbied for its passage. However,
the legislative record documents that most lawmakers were motivated by health,
not protectionist, concerns, even if they were aware that the legislation would
enable the domestic industry to better compete with foreign drugs companies.
The legislative record also shows that a discrete group of legislators, lobbied by
the pharmaceutical industry, voted for the legislation out of a predominantly
protectionist motive.
As a result of the legislation, country B manufacturers suffer a tremendous loss
of revenue. Country B challenges country A's actions as violative of the national
treatment principle in GATT and takes its case to the WTO dispute resolution
body. The WTO must decide whether this is a measure protecting country A's
health or its nascent pharmaceutical industry, or both. If both, the WTO must
decide how much it will intervene in country A's regulatory processes and its
substantive policy choices in the interest of promoting free trade.6
Much of the WTO's adjudicatory guidance that would apply in such a case,
and in the other cases where a measure that burdens trade also furthers a

6. We return to this hypothetical in Part IV. Note that this scenario has real world resonance. Brazil and South
Africa have taken steps to suspend patent protections of foreign drug manufacturers in order to manufacture
domestically cheaper, generic versions of AIDS drugs. These countries have done so by invoking a national
emergency, or public health, exception to the international agreement on intellectual property rights. Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of International Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,

vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, 94 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. See generally Sonia Kumari Katyal, Making Patents
Public: Redefining Intellectual Property When AIDS Drugs Are At Issue, FindLaw Legal Commentary, at

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/200 11101 lKatyal.html (describing Brazil's efforts); Judy Rein,
International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection For Essential Medicines, 21 Nw.

J. INT'L L. & Bus. 379, 400-02 (2001) (describing South Africa's efforts); Robert Weismann, A Long Strange
TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, And the
Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069,

1098-1102 (1996) (discussing the public health protection provision of TRIPS).
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legitimate domestic concern, is contained in the GATT itself. As a matter of
textual commitments, the GATT allows countries to adopt measures that reflect
the level of environmental, health, or other protection of their choice. In other
words, the GATT contains various textual commitments that promise to preserve
national sovereignty and balance trade with other important non-trade values.
Article XX of the GATT, a key provision in the cases discussed in this paper, lists
exceptions to the GATT disciplines that, theoretically, shelter sovereign nations'
rights to further, through measures of their choice, the policy goals listed in that
Article.7 These goals include, prominently, public health and natural resource
conservation. The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) side agreements also contain language reflecting the
GATT's commitment to shelter sovereigns' right to regulate.8
As such, the GATT is what can be referred to as a "negative integration"
contract, which establishes a free trade area that achieves a much lower level of
integration than, say, the European Union (EU) or even NAFTA. The GATT
seeks to reduce tariffs and to remove negative barriers to trade, such as regulation
or taxation, that violate anti-discrimination principles. However, unlike the EU,
the GATT does not seek to unify or harmonize environmental, health or other
measures affecting economic activity. This accords with the basic institutional
structure and historical background of the GATT, which was born after World
War II out of a desire to avoid the isolationist and protectionist policies that were
perceived to have engendered the pre-war depression. Unlike the EU, the GATT
7. The Article XX exceptions to GATT include policies: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) relating to the importation or exportation of silver or gold;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations not inconsistent with the GATT - such as customs,
anti-trust, and intellectual property laws; (e) relating to the products of prison labor; (f) imposed for the
protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archeological value; (g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, as long as they apply to domestic goods; (h) undertaken in pursuance of
intergovemmental commodities agreements that meet the criteria of the contracting parties; (i) involving
restrictions on exports of materials, implemented as part of a governmental stabilization plan; and (j) essential to
the acquisition or distribution of products in short supply. GATT art. XX. These exceptions, and pursuance of
these policies, are subject to the requirement that they not be applied in a "manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" between countries where "the same conditions prevail," and
that they not be applied in a manner constituting a disguised restriction on trade. Id. (preamble, or chapeau, to
Article XX).
8. For example, the preamble to the TBT states that "no country shall be prevented from taking measures
necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal, and plant life or health, of
the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate." Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. However, member States' regulatory flexibility is
limited by the requirement that technical regulations are "not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or
with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to trade." Id. art. 2.2. Similarly, the SPS Agreement explicitly
recognizes the right of governments to take measures to protect human, animal, and plant health, as long as
these are based on science, are necessary for the protection of health, and do not unjustifiably discriminate
among foreign sources of supply. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, arts. 2
& 3, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
(1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
HeinOnline -- 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 638 2002-2003

2003]

THE

WTO's

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE

639

does not have a constitutional organic framework or the political institutions to
harmonize the disparate regulatory markets of its members. In addition, unlike
the EU or NAFTA, the GATT,with over 140 members, is a free trade area that
comprises countries with widely disparate legal and social cultures, including
Communist countries such as China, less developed countries, and industrialized
nations such as the United States. With such an enormous geographical territory
and number of "citizens," achieving widespread common positive rules on
domestic matters a l'Europe would entail the devising of incredibly complicated
and novel democratic institutions. Instead, the GATT limits itself to achieving
negative integration, and the provisions referenced above are intended to balance
the global interest in free trade with the sovereign's right to pursue overriding
legitimate public policy goals. Part II expands on this theme, and it also
introduces the differences in the standards of judicial review of trade-burdening
measures that obtain in free trade areas of varying levels of integration.
Our basic premise is that the negative integration character of GATT is
reflected in the WTO's application of the GATT's anti-discrimination norm to
different categories of cases. What we see emerging is an anti-discrimination
jurisprudence that has as its normative core the rooting out of covert protectionism in a manner intended to shelter legitimate domestic choices. 9 The WTO and
its Dispute Settlement Body (WTO/DSB) has staked out this role in a series of
rulings challenging various types of regulatory requirements of contracting
parties enacted ostensibly for public interest purposes. These rulings seek to
determine whether particular environmental, health, and safety regulations of
contracting States are really covert mechanisms to erect protectionist barriers to
foreign importers or to otherwise undermine the comparative trade advantage of
a foreign supplier of goods or services. Uncovering covert protectionism poses a
series of challenges to the WTO as it carefully navigates the potential dangers in
scrutinizing member States' justification for discriminatory legislation without
second-guessing their substantive judgments regarding protection of the public
and environment. The methodology that the WTO has constructed to navigate
these potential dangers reveals a delicate balancing of structural limitations and
substantive commitments reflected in GATT.
If the WTO departed from this framework, we argue, it would essentially take
on the judicial role of positive integrator without having the institutions, cultural
or historical background, or a treaty basis to achieve harmonization. This would
create a situation where, as the current critics of GATT fear is the case already,
countries with more protective environmental laws would be prevented from
applying their laws altogether - as opposed to being free to choose the desired

9. See generally John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV.
511 (2000) (discussing, in more general terms, the WTO's adjudicative approach to rooting out covert
protectionism through its "antidiscrimination model" as the best system to reinforce democracy while
advancing free trade).
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level of protection, so long as they do not discriminate - without having an active
and historically effective political venue to further their interests and engage in
collective action.' In cases where covert protectionism is found, however, the
WTO does not engage in positive integration by judicial fiat. The WTO/DSB
respects the national sovereign's right to regulate, while protecting the foreign
goods against discriminatory treatment. What is being rooted out is protectionism, not the domestic judgment to achieve a certain level of regulatory protection.
This framework is fully in line with the GATT's core goals, and it keeps the
WTO/DSB from engaging in a Europe-like scrutiny that would be out of line with
the institutional structure of global trade."' Parts III and IV expand on these
themes.
We conclude in Part V with an analysis of a category of cases where the WTO's
anti-discrimination jurisprudential framework may break down and with recommendations on how the WTO/DSB should handle those cases. There may arise
cases where a legitimate State interest unrelated to economic protectionism is so
intertwined with a State interest in protecting the domestic economy from
competition as to make it impossible for a judicial body such as the WTO/DSB to
distinguish between the two drives for the legislation. In these cases, the
WTO/DSB may not invalidate the challenged legislation without interfering to a
substantial extent with national sovereignty and de facto requiring the defendant
State to engage in positive integration. At the same time, if the WTO/DSB does
not intervene, it permits the defendant State to apply a measure that shelters
domestic industry from competition. We use the hypothetical described above to
illustrate these concepts.
The crux of the problem, we contend, is that negative integration contracts are
by definition imperfect. Rooting out protectionism may be an easy task in many
cases. However, where legitimate and illegitimate State interests are closely
intertwined, this "proximity problem" makes it impossible for the WTO to
"tweak with" the measure at issue and root out protectionism without at the same
time interfering with legitimate domestic policy choices and defacto engaging in
positive integration. Our contention, developed in Part V, is that the WTO should,

10. Of course, it is always possible to sign a treaty. But this is vastly different from having a supranational
political context where highly active institutions, acting by majority or other nonunanimous requirement,
constantly engage in harmonization.
11. It should also be noted that, in regulatory coercion cases, the GATT is protecting less developed countries
against the imposition of norms from more developed countries. As we explain in Parts III and IV, the WTO's
jurisprudence prevents one country from forcing other countries (particularly those which cannot afford to
impose stringent environmental and health standards on goods) to give up the comparative trade advantage
inherent in having less restrictive regulations. In doing so, the WTO is enforcing basic GATT principles that
allow trade specialization based on comparative regulatory advantages - that is, trade free of government
obstacles - which are infringed upon by coercive regulatory schemes imposed on trading partners. This
protection can favor developing countries by allowing them to retain whatever comparative advantage they
have from less stringent regulations. Also note that, even in Europe, the European Court has been heavily
criticized for overly interfering with national sovereignty.
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in these types of cases, make a common-law-type evaluation of the extent to
which rooting out protectionism will interfere with national sovereignty and
endanger the relationship between the supranational and the national spheres of
competence.
We conclude, on a general note, that if properly articulated and applied, the
WTO jurisprudence embodies a legitimate application of the trade principles by
which the GATT contracting States agreed to be bound. In other words, the
democratic legitimacy and other concerns raised by the protests and the general
malaise associated with what has been loosely termed "globalization" are not
implicated by the cases under review. While the liberalization of free trade raises
highly complicated and legitimate concerns for domestic agendas on environmental health and other issues, the WTO anti-discrimination norm may root out
protectionism, up to the point where the GATT intended domestic sovereignty to
preempt supranational intrusion. That is not to say that the GATT is a wonderfully functioning treaty that does not implicate any concern for domestic
sovereignty. The negative integration feature of GATT is a double-edged sword.
At the same time as it shelters domestic measures from aggressive judicial
review, it permits States to choose low levels of regulatory protection and uses
this regulatory comparative advantage to attract manufacturers. How to address
this and other problems associated with economic globalization lies beyond the
scope of this Article. However, if properly understood, the theory and doctrine
that underlie the WTO jurisprudential framework should in most cases achieve
the proper balance between free trade and national sovereignty.

II.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK: THE SPECTRUM OF TRADE INTEGRATION

A.

LEVELS OF INTEGRATION

There are various levels of integration of sovereign jurisdictions and markets
into a supranational entity. These varying levels may be conceptualized as falling
alongside a "spectrum of integration." The ultimate level of integration is the
combination of the individual sovereign components into a single State, possibly
a federal State, with one set of applicable laws and with common institutions. The
least deeply integrated level of integration consists of the lowering of tariffs and
equivalent obstacles so as to permit the freer movement of goods among
sovereign markets. There are many intermediate points, which include the
creation of a customs union,' 2 the elimination of barriers to the free movement of
services, capital or labor, the approximation of laws in designated areas, the
adoption of a common currency and monetary policy, the establishment of

12. In a customs union, unlike a free trade area, the component entities adopt a common tariff vis-A-vis the
outside world.
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supranational institutions, and others.' 3
In this Part, we first explain the features of the GATT that make it fall within
the less integrated side of the "spectrum of integration." Towards that end, we
review some of the hallmarks of integration from such areas as the EU and
NAFTA and contrast those hallmarks with the features of the GATT that make it a
less integrated idea. We use, throughout this Part, the dichotomy of "positive"
versus "negative" integration to distinguish with broad strokes among varying
levels of integration. We explain how the GATT/WTO is principally a negative
integration contract that is focused on preventing its contracting States from
discriminating against foreign products. We conclude this Part by setting forth
our theoretical argument that the WTO/DSB is engaged in an anti-discrimination
jurisprudence that respects the negative integration structure of the GATT and
that negative-integration contracts by definition constrain the WTO/DSB's ability
to root out protectionism in domestic measures that also embody legitimate
purposes. This argument is developed and illustrated further in the following
Parts.
B.

ONE END OF THE SPECTRUM: THE EU, NAFTA, AND POSITIVE INTEGRATION

Polities that achieve a higher level of economic integration tend to have certain
related hallmarks, including a relatively high level of "positive integration," a
relatively deep social and political basis for integration, and relatively developed
institutions. Positive integration is achieved principally through harmonization or
unification of the laws of the individual components of the supranational polity.
When borders are open for trade in goods, there are two categories of problems
that arise, both of which may call for positive integration measures. First, the
disparity in regulatory environments rewards countries that impose a lesser
degree of regulatory protection in such fields as the environment, labor, or
intellectual property. The lowering of barriers to trade means that the import of
goods from those countries to jurisdictions with higher levels of protection
essentially imports the lower level of protection together with the goods. So, for
example, say that Mexico has less restrictive (or unenforced) labor or environmental laws. American manufacturers may, if tariffs and other negative obstacles to
trade were removed, shift their production to Mexico. In such a case, when the

13. See generally J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR'?" AND OTHER ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 18 (1999); JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN UNION LAW,

chs. I and 3 (3d ed. 2000); JACQUES MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001); Eric Stein,
InternationalIntegration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489 (2001); Aaron A.
Afilalo, ConstitutionalizationThrough the Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA's Chapter /1, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2001); Craig L. Jackson, Social Policy Harmonizationand Worker Rights in the
European Union:A Modelfor North America?, 21 N.C.J. INT'L 1. & CoM. REG. 1 (1995); George A. Zaphiriou,
Unification and Harmonization of Law Relating to Global and Regional Trading, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 407

(1994).
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American consumer imports a Mexican-made U.S. car, the consumer essentially
imports a lower level of regulatory protection with the car.' 4
The second and related problem is that the disparity in laws affecting
commerce acts as an impediment to the free movement of goods. Let's say that
France has a different philosophy regarding woodworker safety than Germany.
Germany relies heavily on training its workers to use sophisticated woodworking
machines and to react appropriately in an injury-threatening situation. France, on
the other hand, relies more on automation and assumes that workers incapable of

reacting to a crisis will operate machines. 15 It is difficult to say that one country
has a more stringent security requirement. However, the fundamental differences
in the regulatory environment will in all likelihood impede the import of German
machines into the French market. 16
The trade solution to these two problems has been harmonization or unification
of laws, a classical positive integration scenario. NAFTA's "side agreement on
labor" (the Labor Agreement), for instance, provides one model of integration
that is intended to take care of the race to the bottom problem. 17 American labor
unions, backed by Ross Perot's "Great Sucking Sound" campaign theme, had
vehemently opposed the execution of NAFTA by the United States. The "Great
Sucking Sound" image captured the fear that American businesses would transfer
production and other facilities from the United States to Mexico in order to take
advantage not only of lower wages, but of unenforced labor laws on such core
issues as the right to organize, bargain collectively, strike, and be free from race

or gender discrimination. 18

14. This problem has often been styled the "race to the bottom problem." See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Damien
Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade
Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 267 (1997); James Salzman, Seattle's Legal Legacy and
Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, 31 ENVTL L. 501, 505 (2001). The fear is not only that American
businesses may shift operations to more laxly regulated jurisdictions, but also that the American regulator would
be tempted to "race to the bottom" to protect the competitive ability of the domestic industry.
15. This scenario was presented to the Court of Justice of the European Community in Commission v. France
(Woodworking), [1986] E.C.R. 419. The basic thrust of the provisions of French law at issue was a requirement
that woodworking machines should be so constructed that their operation, adjustment, and maintenance present
no risks for workers if those operations are carried out under the conditions laid down by the manufacturer or
importer. In order to meet this standard, woodworking machines required a high level of automation. Germany,
on the other hand, followed a policy approach to safety that relied more on worker training and competency than
on automation.
16. This problem will likely manifest itself each time a law affecting commerce requires an "out of
jurisdiction" business to engage in additional costs as a condition to entry in the host jurisdiction. Thus,
variations in environmental, corporate, intellectual property or banking laws will hinder the free flow of goods
among jurisdictions.
17. For a description of the Labor Agreement and insights drawn from the early experience with that treaty,
see David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J.
163, 192-99 (1997); Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, EarlyExperience with NA FTA's Labor Side Accord, 18
COMP. LAB. L.J. 161, 165-66 (1997).

18. Ross Perot introduced the notion of "The Great Sucking Sound" to the American public in televised
debates during the 1992 presidential campaign and in a later debate with Vice President Gore. The '92 Vote: The
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The Labor Agreement embodied the Clinton Administration's response to
these concerns. Trade negotiators found that Mexico had, on the books, highly
protective labor laws. Those laws, however, were poorly enforced or not enforced
at all. The Labor Agreement, then, required among other things that each NAFTA
party' 9 take all necessary measures to enforce its labor laws effectively. While the
Labor Agreement itself suffers from serious enforcement deficit problems related
to unions' and workers' lack of access to an effective dispute resolution system,

theoretically it leveled the labor playing field among the NAFTA parties. Of
course, Mexican workers would still be paid less than their U.S. counterparts.
However, requiring Mexico to enforce its laws would deter American businesses
from racing to a jurisdiction out of a desire to employ workers whose basic labor
20
rights were not protected.
On the highly integrated side of the spectrum, the EU engaged in a massive
harmonization and unification of a wide array of laws. The European effort went
well beyond NAFTA's attempts to address the race to the bottom problem
described above. European harmonization focused on harmonizing the regulatory
environment of the member States, so as to create a truly "single" market. While
harmonization in Europe is far from having achieved complete harmonization of
laws,2 ' laws dealing with a wide range of economic and social issues are
becoming uniform throughout Europe. Thus, directives have been issued for
member States to harmonize their legal rules in such disparate categories of legal
fields as health measures, employment rules on the treatment of job applicants,
balance sheet disclosure requirements, the protection of famous trademarks,
privacy rights in electronic data, and product safety requirements.2 2 The adoption
of a common currency in most member States of the EU has topped the economic
integration achievements of Europe. European businesses may now avoid the
transaction costs associated with disparate currencies. In addition, on a fundamen-

tal level, the member States that have joined the Euro zone have relinquished to
the EU, through central bank action and the establishment of economic objectives
that those member States were required to achieve in order to participate in the
monetary union enterprise, a substantial amount of sovereignty over monetary

2nd Presidential Debate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 15, 1992); The '92 Vote: The 3rd PresidentialDebate
(ABC television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1992); Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993); see
Lance Compa, InternationalLabor Rights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case

Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117 (1993).
19. We are using the NAFTA terminology, which refers to the contracting States as "parties."
20. See generally Joaquin F. Otero, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation:An Assessment
ofIts First Year's Implementation, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 637 (1995).
21. See, e.g., Thomas J.M. Mollers, The Role of Law in European Integration,48 AM. J. COMP. L. 679 (2000)

(noting that harmonization has achieved "islands of integration"). The legal landscape of the European Union is
commonly mistaken to have achieved full harmonization.
22. Id.; see also Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform CorporateLaw in the European Union, 31 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 377 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 644 2002-2003

2003]

THE WTO's

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE

and other domestic economic policies.2 3
As noted above, relatively advanced integration tends to come with a relatively
deep social and political basis for integration and relatively developed institutions. In Europe, for example, institutions that, although flawed, replicate the
institutional structure of modem liberal democracies supported positive integration. The European Commission works out the details of the integration proposals. The European Council votes on them, with various degrees of participation
from the European Parliament. The national institutions of the member States
routinely implement directives.2 4 Clear and unconditional regulations (the equivalent of statutes) have direct effect in the territory of the member States.2 ' To top it
all, the European treaties give individuals a right of access to the national courts
to enforce European law, under the overall supervision of the ECJ.26 To be sure,
Europe suffers from an infamous "democracy deficit," stemming in part from the
fact that the European Council, comprised of representatives of the executive
branches of the member States' governments, holds true legislative power.27
Nonetheless, the European system has an elaborate set of institutions designed to
produce a massive number of effective laws for the economic integration of the
European Union.
The obvious correlative effect of supranational integration is the relinquishment by the constituent States of their national sovereign rights. Here the
historical context for integration is an important factor in determining the extent
to which a country has agreed to relinquish national sovereignty. In Europe, for
example, integration was supported by the cultural and historical context of the
EU. The EU was born out of the historical drive to eliminate the enmity between
France and Germany by binding those nations to a partnership that would include

23. See, e.g., Robert Mundel, Monetary Unions and the Problem of Sovereignty, 579 ANNALS 123 (2002);
Dominick Salvatore, The Euro, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary System, 579
ANNALS 153 (2002).

24. See generally JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN UNION LAW, chs. 1-2 (3d ed. 2000); Stein, supra note 13, at
489.
25. The principle of direct effect of Community law was established early on by the European Court in its
seminal decision in Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1,
7, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963). The direct effect jurisprudence of the European Court is intricate, especially
as it relates to whether directives (as opposed to, say, treaty provisions or regulations) have direct effect in
lawsuits brought by individuals against other individuals. See, e.g., Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton
& South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (1986); Case C-91/92, Faccini
Dori v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325, 1 C.M.L.R. 665 (1995). Nonetheless, the principal point is that, by
making direct effect the norm regardless of what national constitutional law has to say on the question,
the European Court has made European law an integral part of the legal system of the member States, rather
than an amorphous norm of international law occasionally enforceable between States. See WEILER, supra
note 13.
26. See generally ANGELA WARD, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES IN EC LAW (2000).

27. See, e.g., Paola Michelle Koo, Note, The Struggle for Democratic Legitimacy Within the European
Union, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 111 (2001).
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common economic and social laws and institutions. 2 8 The explicit goals were to
achieve, in leaps and bounds, the "United States of Europe."' 29 As the recent
"European constitutional convention" and the adoption of the Euro demonstrate,
this program is still very much part of the European agenda. In addition, although
the expansion of the European Union makes this less true than it was in the days
of the "Europe of the Six," that integrated area has bound nations with relatively
similar cultures and norms, which has made it easier to harmonize or unify laws
than if, say, China and the United States were being asked to unify their legal systems.
Likewise, but again on a smaller scale, NAFTA arose not only out of a desire to
integrate markets economically, but also to address some of the social and
cultural issues peculiar to this geopolitical area. Thus, NAFTA seeks in part to
develop Mexico's economy so as to stem the influx of illegal Mexican immigrants into the United States. The loss of jobs that may result from the transfer of
manufacturing facilities to Mexico, the basic argument goes, will be offset not
only by the development of Mexico into a larger import market, but by the gradual
resolution of a perceived social problem associated with illegal immigration. In
addition, one of the explicit underlying goals of NAFTA is to lay the foundation for a
Western hemisphere economic counterpart to the European Union.3 °
C. THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM: THE GATI AS A NEGATIVE INTEGRATION TREATY

The GATT/WTO squarely falls on the less integrated side of the spectrum. The

28. The historical background for the European Union is well documented. Its most powerful expression is
probably found in the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, routinely described as the European equivalent to
the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which provides in pertinent parts:
The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to
the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of
champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A
united Europe was not achieved, and we had war.
The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately provide for the setting-up of common bases
for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of
those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they
have been the most constant victims.
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and the
Federal Republic of Germany becomes, not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.
29. Id.
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. It will be built through
concrete achievements, which first create a defacto solidarity. The gathering of the nations of Europe
requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The first concern in any action undertaken must be these two countries.
30. See Michael W. Gordon, Economic Integration in North America - An Agreement of Limited Dimensions
but Unlimited Expectations, 56 Moo. L. REV. 157 (1993). See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., NAFTA: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 31-32 (2000).
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GATT is a free trade area, not a customs union. Its primary purpose is to foster the
movement of goods across borders free of certain specified legal obstacles. The
core GATT disciplines are all intended to further this goal. The tariff-binding
discipline requires the GATT signatories to keep tariffs below ceilings specified
with respect to each product category ("you shall not impose tariffs above the
agreed upon level"). The national treatment discipline ensures that States do not
circumvent their negative covenant not to impose tariffs above the binding by
imposing internal taxation or regulation that treats similarly situated foreign
products less favorably than their domestic counterparts ("you shall not impose
discriminatory taxation or regulation"). The quota and like measures discipline
ensures that States do not circumvent their negative covenant not to impose
the same economic effect
tariffs above the binding by imposing quotas that3have
1
quotas").
impose
not
shall
("you
as a tariff would
Each discipline consists of a negative covenant, making the GATT primarily a
negative integration contract.32 The fundamental objective of such a contract is to
permit States to specialize in areas where they have an absolute or comparative
advantage and to engage in trade in goods free of regulation that burdens such
comparative advantage. To be sure, the GATT has made some intrusions into
positive integration. The intellectual property provisions of GATT, for example,
33
require the contracting parties to achieve certain mandated levels of protection.
However, by and large, the GATT is about removing defined obstacles to trade,
namely tariffs above agreed upon ceilings, discriminatory taxation or regulation,
and quotas. Unlike the European or NAFTA harmonization initiatives described
above, the GATT does little beyond the negative integration of goods markets.
This structure makes sense. The very nature of the GATT makes it difficult, at
least until we achieve a true "global government," to go beyond negative
integration. Unlike the EU, the GATT does not have political institutions or the
will to deeply harmonize the disparate regulatory markets of its members. In
addition, unlike the EU or NAFTA, the GATT, with over 140 members, is a free
trade area that comprises countries with widely disparate legal and social
cultures, including communist countries such as China, less developed countries,
and industrialized nations such as the United States. With such an enormous
geographical territory and number of "citizens," achieving widespread common
positive rules on domestic matters d 1'Europe would entail the devising of
incredibly complicated and novel democratic institutions.

31. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1999).
32. There are of course important GATT provisions, such as the intellectual property provisions of TRIPS,
which go well beyond negative integration.
33. See Robert J. Pechman, Note, Seeking Multilateral Protectionfor Intellectual Property: The United
States "TRIPS" over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179, 179 (1998); Naomi Bass, Note, Implications
of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in
the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 191 (2002).
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The relatively low level of positive integration achieved by the GATT defines
the role of the WTO/DSB as the evaluator, under international trade, of allegedly
discriminatory regulation justified by environmental, health, and other public
interests. The EU and the U.S. experience shows that the level of judicial review
of legislation under free movement of goods principles varies with the level of
integration of the area at issue. In the EU, the Court of Justice of the European
Community (ECJ) initially took a highly aggressive integrationist stance in
reviewing legislation that burdened trade. It ruled that any national measure that
actually or potentially could burden trade among the member States would be
subject to scrutiny under the free movement of goods provisions of the European
Treaties. 34 Applying this extremely broad standard, the ECJ reviewed an astonishingly high number of cases involving all manner of legislation, including product
safety requirements, woodworker safety requirements (the example described
above), Sunday closing laws, pornography standards, restrictions on door-todoor or other methods of advertising, restrictions on the permissible outlets of
certain products, the prohibition of resale at less than production cost, and
others.3 5 In these cases, the ECJ established a framework whereby it would
evaluate whether the strength of the national interest advanced by the challenged
measure outweighs the attendant burden on trade. To aid its analysis, the ECJ
established a "presumption of mutual reciprocity," whereby the ECJ would start
with the premise that a standard acceptable to one member State should normally
be satisfactory throughout the Union.3 6 In other words, the European Court went
well beyond the rooting out of protectionism and establish itself as the supreme
adjudicator of whether the trade burden attendant to disparities in the legal
environments of the member States is justified by countervailing domestic
37
concerns.

34. Procureur du Roi v. Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, 2 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974).
35. See ALAN DASHWOOD AND DERRICK WYATT, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 123-46 (1986);
LAURENCE GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC, THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF

ARTICLES 30-36 OF THE EEC TREATY (1985). For classic ECJ cases on the conflict between trade restraints and
domestic policies, see R. v. Henn and Darby, I C.M.L.R. 246 (1980) (British pornography laws); Case 145/88,
Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q Plc, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337 (1990) (British Sunday closing laws);
GB-INNO-BM v. Conf6d6ration du Commerce, 1990 E.C.R. 1-0667 (Belgian restriction on content of
advertising leaflets).
36. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979
E.C.R. 649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979).
37. Private parties were quick to take advantage of a supranational jurisprudence that enabled them to
challenge regulation that generally burdened businesses. Ultimately, faced with strong criticism that its
"activist" jurisprudence unduly endangered national sovereignty by forcing States to defend the policies behind
every measure affecting commerce, the ECJ retreated and announced that it would only review legislation that
affected product or packaging content. In other words, laws such as Sunday closing laws or advertising
regulation would be sheltered from review. Nonetheless, the ECJ greatly contributed, and continues to
contribute, to the economic integration of Europe by applying norms that tend to eliminate disparities between
the regulatory environments of the member States. See Norbert Reich, The 'November Revolution' of the
European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi Revisited, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 459 (1994); Jules Stuyck,
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In the United States, the Supreme Court also went well beyond the rooting out
of covert protectionist in its Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. To be
sure, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce. In addition, however, the Supreme Court has
followed a balancing approach to scrutinize neutral laws that "unduly burden"
interstate commerce. "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental," the Court has long held, "it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 38
Some Justices, such as Justice Scalia, have criticized the Court's balancing
approach and advocated an approach that focuses on rooting out protectionism.
Nonetheless, the balancing approach remains firmly entrenched in the Court's
jurisprudence.
Unlike these courts, which operate in a federal State and in a highly integrated
polity, the jurisprudence of the WTO/DSB focuses on rooting out covert
protectionism. It does not seek to eliminate disparities in the legal environments
of the contracting States by balancing the trade burden of a measure against the
benefits of its underlying purposes. This accords with the negative integration
character of GATT. In the European Union and the United States, the reviewing
court acts against a background of positive integration. If the ECJ, for example,
invalidates the French safety requirements, it knows that legislative activity to
establish EU-wide standards in the field is likely to be afoot. In addition, the close
cultural proximity of the member States enables the ECJ to apply its presumption
of mutual reciprocity. After all, the theory goes, each member State has comparable regulatory goals or at least minimal regulatory requirements that do not fall
far from those of most other member States. In the GATT, by contrast, there is no
political institutional framework for harmonization, and the contracting States'
regulatory frameworks span the entire spectrum of ideological and regulatory
choices.
Therefore, the GATT dictates that the WTO's review of domestic measures be
constrained. In the following Parts, we develop our construct of the antidiscrimination jurisprudence that the WTO is applying, and we argue that it
accords with the negative integration goals of the GATT.
III.

(ANTI) DISCRIMINATION AND TRADE: ITS NORMS AND FORMS

This Part begins to lay the groundwork for demonstrating how, in our view, the
WTO/DSB has developed an anti-discrimination jurisprudence. In this Part, we
articulate the pervasive anti-discrimination norm in the GATT treaty itself,

L'arr~t Keck et Mithouard (vente tiperte) et ses consiquences sur la libre circulation des marchandises, 1994
Cahiersde Droit Europden 431; Laurence Gormley, Two Years After Keck, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 866 (1996).

38. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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including its side agreements. We then categorize the cases under review into
three categories of discriminatory State action: cases of disparate regulatory
treatment of foreign and domestic producers through an internal measure of the
importing jurisdiction, cases where an import restriction is used to coerce a
change in the internal laws of the exporting jurisdiction, and cases where a
facially neutral, internal measure has a disparate impact on foreign products.
Each case calls for the application of different GATT anti-discrimination doctrines to root out covert protectionism. The next Part will articulate how these
doctrines, and the anti-discrimination norms they embody, are applied to the three
categories of cases in a way that furthers the negative integration goals of the
GATT while sheltering domestic sovereignty to the fullest extent possible.
A.

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION NORMS IN THE GATT

The core GATT disciplines embody a seemingly formal anti-discrimination or
equality norm, requiring equal treatment of similarly situated foreign products
and producers and prohibiting the contracting States from targeting foreign
products with import restrictions. Article I contains the most favored nation
obligation, which requires that any privilege or advantage given to the product of
one WTO member nation be extended to the "like product" of all other WTO
members. 39 Article III contains the national treatment obligation, which prohibits
contracting States from giving foreign products regulatory or tax treatment less
favorable than that afforded to "like" domestic products 40 and generally prohibits

39. The relevant section reads:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation
or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities
in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.
GAIT art. I, para. 1.
40. This obligation is contained in two parts of Article III. Paragraph 2 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges
of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products....
Paragraph 4 further states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no lessfavourablethan that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use....
GATT art. III, paras. 2, 4 (emphasis added).
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domestic measures and regulations from being used to protect domestic industry. 4
Article XI of the GATT prohibits the imposition of bans, quotas, licenses, and
similar measures on exported and imported products. 42 Like many of the GATT
side agreements, the TBT and SPS agreements both include GATT's most
favored nation and national treatment obligations.4 3
Although the plain language of GATT's anti-discrimination norm reads formally, the WTO/DSB has consistently infused this norm with a substantive
meaning consistent with broader GATT goals. One example would be the
interpretation of the term "less favorable" treatment which contains the national
treatment discipline. The WTO has stated that "a formal difference in treatment
between imported and like domestic products" is neither "necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation" of that GATT provision."4 The critical inquiry in
determining whether the regulating country is treating the foreign importer less
favorably involves an assessment of whether the importing country has been
deprived of equality of competitive opportunities, not mere difference of treatment. 45 Similarly, the interpretation of "like products" has grown to contain a
substantive relational assessment of the nature and extent of a competitive
relationship between and among foreign and domestic products in the regulated
marketplace.4 6 For example, in determining whether two products are "like," the
41. Article I1l, paragraph I states:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations
and requirement affecting the internal sales, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of
products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products
so as to affordprotection to domestic production ....
GATT art. Ill, para. I (emphasis added).
42. It states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on
the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party.
GAITT art. XI, para. 1.
43. Thus, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement states that "in respect of their technical regulations, products
imported from the territory of any Member be accorded treatment no lessfavourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country." TBTAgreement, supra note 8,
art. 2.1 (emphasis added). The SPS Agreement similarly requires contracting States to "ensure that any sanitary
and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identicalor
similar conditionsprevail." SPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.3 (emphasis added).
44. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
AB-2000-8 WT/DS 161, 169 AB/R (00-5347), Jan. 10, 2001, para. 137 [hereinafter Korea Beef].
45. Id. para. 136 (citing United States- Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, BISD 36S/345, para. 5.11, Nov.
7, 1989). Thus, Korea's dual retail distribution system for domestic and imported beef violated the national
treatment provision because it imposed "a drastic reduction of commercial opportunity to reach, and hence to
generate sales to, the same consumers served by the traditional retail channels for domestic beef." Id. para 145.
46. Asbestos, supra note 2, para. 154.
HeinOnline -- 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 651 2002-2003

THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:633

WTO will look beyond the formal categorization of the products and examine
whether the domestic and imported products are "directly competitive or substitutable" in the marketplace.4 7 Thus, the WTO has expressly linked the concept of
prohibited discrimination in trade with rooting out protectionism. As the Appellate Body has said most recently, the term "less favorable treatment" of like
products expresses the general principle, contained in Article III, paragraph 1,
that regulations should not be applied "so as to afford protection to domestic
production. 4 8
Less favorable treatment of similarly situated or "like" products or producers
is allowed if the sovereign is pursuing legitimate public policy goals. Article XX
sets forth a list of per se legitimate policy goals, including measures that are
"necessary" to protect human, animal or plant life and health, and those that are
"relating" to the conservation of "exhaustible natural resources., 49 The TBT
Agreement contains a similar list of "legitimate goals."' 50 A sovereign may
expressly, or openly, treat less favorably "like" foreign products or producers for instance, by applying regulatory burdens or outright bans not applicable to
similar domestic products
or producers - in the pursuit of environmental or
51
public health goals.
However, there is another layer of scrutiny even for those measures that are
facially valid - either because a measure does not expressly discriminate or does
so for legitimate public policy objectives. In addition to a formal antidiscrimination norm of equal treatment, GATT also concerns itself with the
manner in which a measure is applied. Under GATT provisions, an otherwise
facially legitimate measure may nevertheless be deemed illegitimate, or discriminatory, if it is applied in a manner that reveals covert protectionism. This level of
review is an equally substantive norm of anti-discrimination, focusing less on the
formal treatment of similarly situated products or producers and more on the
ways in which a contracting State may deprive a trading partner of its comparative trade advantage, even when its actions may otherwise seem legitimate. The
GATT's concerns for covert trade protectionism in the application of a measure is
captured in its pervasive language which cautions against measures applied in a
manner which constitutes "unjustifiable" or "arbitrary" discrimination, a "disguised

47. See generally Vodka/Shochu, supra note 4; see also Report of the Appellate Body, Chile - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1999-6, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DSI 10/AB/R (99-5414), Jan. 12, 2000 [hereinafter
Chile Taxes].
48. Asbestos, supra note 2, para. 100.
49. See GAT art. XX.
50. TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2 ("Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security
requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or
health, or the environment.").
5 1. Whether a State is actually pursuing these goals, or using them as a cover for protectionism, is revealed
both in the application of a ends-means analysis that we argue the WTO is engaged in throughout its
anti-discrimination jurisprudence. See Section III, infra.
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restriction on trade," or otherwise "affords protection" to domestic products. This
language appears for instance in Article III's national treatment obligation
provisions, the preamble (chapeau) to the Article XX exceptions, as well as
within the text of the TBT and SPS side agreements.5 2 Whether a particular
environmental or health measure constitutes covert protectionism depends on a
careful case-by-case balancing approach, taking into account both the structure of
the measure as well as the policy objectives to be achieved.53 As the WTO has
articulated it, "the protective application can most often be discerned from the
design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of the measure."54
To sum up, there are two primary ways in which a WTO member may lawfully
"discriminate" against other WTO members or their products without international sanction, according to the terms of the GATT. First, a member State may
enact a regulation which treats imported products or producers less favorably so
long as the two classes of products or two types of producers are not "like" or
similarly situated (e.g., "where identical or similar conditions prevail.") 55 Second, a member State may treat imported products less favorably, and even ban
such products, if it is pursuing one of the legitimate goals set forth in the Article
XX exceptions, and such unfavorable treatment does not amount to an "unjustifiable" or "arbitrary" discrimination, or a "disguised restriction on trade." Not
surprisingly, resolving the tension between a member State's sovereign right to
pursue environmental and health goals that also burden international trade
depends greatly on how the WTO interprets and gives meaning to these terms.
The way in which the WTO/DSB has interpreted these terms, particularly where

52. GATT art. XX. As the WTO/DSB has said, this language exists in the chapeau to Article XX to prevent
any abuse of the Article XX exceptions, particularly using measures adopted under the guise of one of the
exceptions as a form of covert protectionism. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 2, para. 22 (noting that while
the exceptions apply to the measure itself, the chapeau addresses the manner in which a measure is applied; its
purpose is generally the prevention of abuse of the exceptions. Also, among the terms "arbitrary discrimination," "unjustifiable discrimination," and "disguised restriction on trade" within the chapeau, the latter is the
broadest term, inclusive of the other two. A "disguised restriction" can be interpreted as a restriction taken under
the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX).
The TBT Agreement cautions contracting States to "ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted, or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade" and
advising that such regulations "shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective,
taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create." TBT Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2. The SPS
Agreement also cautions that SPS measures "not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade." SPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.3.
Finally, Article III dictates that taxes and other regulations "should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic production." GATT art. 1Il, para. I (emphasis added).
53. The actual contours and content of these standards, the WTO has explained, will vary as the kind of
measure under examination varies. The standard of "arbitrary discrimination," for instance, under the chapeau
to Article XX may be different for a measure that purports to be necessary to protect public morals than for one
relating to the products of prison labor. Shrimp I, supra note 2, para. 120.
54. Chile Taxes, supra note 47, para. 60 (quoting Vodka/Shochu, supra note 4, para. 29) (rejecting the
consideration of the subjective intentions of legislators or regulators).
55. SPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.3.
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it is faced with discriminatory treatment for the purpose of advancing public
interest regarding State goals, constitutes its anti-discrimination jurisprudence.
B.

A TYPOLOGY OF DISCRIMINATORY REGULATION

There are three ways in which contracting States can enact environmental,
health, and safety regulations to deprive a country of its comparative trade
advantage and constitute a form of covert protectionism. First, a country might
expressly treat foreign and domestic suppliers disparately by applying different
regulatory standards to imported products (disparate treatment). Second, a
country might condition market access on a change in the regulatory environment
of the export jurisdiction, for a legitimate public interest goal (like natural
resource protection), resulting in the imposition of unnecessary and extraordinary
costs on foreign importers (regulatory coercion). Third, a country's regulation
may favor certain products which promote the domestic public interest goals, but
which disproportionately disadvantages the foreign -supplier specializing in the
disfavored product (disparateimpact). Each of these types of regulations operate
to deprive the importing countries of their comparative trade advantage by
creating higher regulatory burdens on foreign imports or banning them altogether.
1. Disparate Treatment
The most obvious type of discrimination is a regulation that expressly
distinguishes between the treatment of foreign and domestic producers or
products (either facially or as applied) in order to protect the public from a
specific type of health or environmental harm. A country can create the functional
equivalent of a tariff by erecting regulatory barriers in the form of differing
substantive environmental or health standards, or different procedures to meet
those standards, which foreign companies must meet before importing products
into a country. This type of regulation deprives the importing countries of their
comparative trade advantage by adding to the foreign importers' cost of selling
their product in the regulating country, a cost not imposed on domestic producers
of the same product, or by precluding the opportunity to sell its product in the
regulating country altogether.
The starkest example of a disparate treatment regulation is a status-based ban.
Such regulation deprives trading opportunities for a product because it originates
from a particular foreign country, ostensibly for health or environmental reasons.
For example, in Thai Cigarettes, Thailand's Tobacco Act of 1996 (Tobacco Act)
effectively banned the import of any form of tobacco.5 6 The Act required the
importer to obtain a license from the Thai government. The problem, however,
was that the Thai government had not granted any import licenses for cigarettes

56. Thai-Cigarettes,supranote 2, para. 6.
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since 1980, and only then it had granted licenses to the "Thai Tobacco Monopoly." Thailand sought to justify its import prohibition by pointing to the
increased health risks that would inevitably flow from the opening of its markets
to, in particular, the United States cigarette industry.57 The United States
disagreed, complaining that Thailand's restriction on the importation of its
cigarettes violated the prohibition against quantitative restrictions and that the
true intention of the Act was to protect the Thai domestic cigarette industry.
A less extreme form of disparate treatment was challenged in the Reformulated
Gasoline case. There, the United States imposed a higher regulatory burden on
foreign gasoline refiners on the grounds that verification of their compliance with
Clean Air Act requirements was harder to achieve.5 8 The specific regulation at
issue was the baseline establishment method to ensure that the level of air
pollution caused by gasoline combustion did not exceed 1990 levels and that
pollutants be reduced in major population areas. The regulation (the so-called
"Gasoline Rule") employed individual (established by the regulated entity) and
statutory (established by the EPA to reflect average 1990 U.S. gasoline quality)
baselines, depending on the nature of the entity concerned. 59 Domestic refiners,
blenders, and importers were allowed to establish an individual baseline representing the quality of their 1990 gasoline before they were forced to use the more
stringent statutory baseline set by the EPA, while foreign refiners were not. The
application of different baselines for domestic refiners and foreign refiners
prompted complaints by countries like Venezuela and Brazil that exported
gasoline to the United States. 60 These countries complained that the Gasoline
Rule discriminated against foreigners by not allowing foreign refiners to use
individual baselines and by limiting the methods by which domestic importers
could calculate their baselines. The United States defended the regulation, in part,
by arguing that it was justified under the Article XX exceptions protecting animal
life and conserving exhaustible natural resources. 6 '
2. Regulatory Coercion
Instead of erecting different regulatory standards for foreign and domestic

57. Thailand pointed out three reasons why opening up its market to the American cigarette industry would
pose further harm to its public: (1) American cigarettes are specifically targeted at women, of whom only 3.5%
smoked in Thailand (compared to 30% in Western countries); (2) experience in Asia and Latin America has
shown that once a market is opened, the United States cigarette industry exerts great efforts to force
governments to accept its terms and conditions, which undermine public health, circumvent advertising bans,
and use modem marketing techniques to boost sales; and (3) cigarettes manufactured in the United States may
be more harmful than Thai cigarettes because United States cigarette companies use unknown chemicals in
cigarettes, in part to compensate for lower tar and nicotine levels. Id. paras. 27-28.
58. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 2, at 19-20.
59. Id.at 4.
60. Id.at 8-9.
61. Id. at 8.
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producers, a country can discriminate against foreign suppliers by conditioning
market access on the achievement of certain regulatory standards in their host
jurisdiction. This type of formal equality - equal application of regulatory
standards - forces foreign suppliers to adopt within their own jurisdiction
essentially the same environmental or public health policy as the regulating
nation in order to export its goods into the regulating nation. The core of this form
of regulation is its extraterritorial reach. The upshot of this scheme is to impose
additional costs of producing and selling products for the suppliers targeted by
the regulation. This can create a comparative disadvantage, particularly for less
developed countries, by depriving the coerced countries of the comparative trade
advantage that flows from less restrictive environmental standards - such as
exploiting and using resources as more developed countries already have done.
An example of this type of coercive regulatory scheme was at issue in the
Tuna/Dolphin dispute between the United States and various countries over the
U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972.62 This Act prohibited the importation of yellowfin tuna or tuna products into the United States that were caught
using harvesting methods that harmed dolphins (i.e., using purse seine nets). 63 As
a condition of access to the U.S. market for tuna, each importing country was
required to prove to the satisfaction of the U.S. authorities that its overall
regulatory regime regarding the taking of marine mammals was comparable to
that of the United States. 64 The intent of the embargo was to encourage a boycott
of tuna caught using unsafe harvesting methods. The embargo consisted of both a
primary nation and intermediary nation embargo.6 5 The primary nation embargo
targeted Mexico directly. The intermediary nation embargo prevented the importation of tuna from countries that purchased tuna from Mexico. The Netherlands
and the EEC later brought a complaint against the United States regarding the
intermediary embargoes of tuna.66 The United States argued that the embargo
was nondiscriminatory, and hence not in violation of the national treatment and
prohibition on quantitative restriction, because it subjected domestic U.S. fishing
vessels to the same requirements as those imposed on foreign vessels.67 Even if
the embargo was discriminatory, the United States sought to defend the embargo
under the Article XX exceptions, as necessary to protect the life and health of
dolphins.6 8

62. See Tuna I, supra note 2; Tuna H, supra note 2.

63. Marine Mammal Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-222, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972).
64. Tuna 1,supra note 2, para. 5.2.
65. Tuna 1, supra note 2, para. 5.5.
66. Tuna I1, supra note 2.
67. Tuna 1, supra note 2, paras. 3.11-3.16.

68. The United States argued the ban was justified under Article XX(b) as necessary to protect animal life
and conserve exhaustible natural resources because (1) dolphins are a threatened species, (2) there is credible
scientific evidence that yellowfin tuna and dolphins can be found in the same waters, (3) catching tuna does
result in incidental killing of dolphins, and (4) prohibiting the use of purse seine nets can minimize the
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Shrimp/Turtle, similarly, grappled with yet another U.S. law which prohibited
the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products in the United States that
were harvested with commercial fishing technology that harmed sea turtles, an
endangered species. 69 The law, however, exempted qualifying shrimp harvesting
nations from the import ban subject to certification by the Secretary of State that
the importing country either adopted a comparable regulatory program or the
country has a fishing environment that does not pose a threat to the incidental
taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting.7 ° India, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Thailand challenged the shrimp ban, arguing that ban was applied
71
without a serious attempt to reach a cooperative multilateral solution with them
and that it discriminated impermissibly among exporting countries and between
exporting countries and the United States.72 The United States argued that the ban
reasonably differentiated between countries on the basis of the risk posed to
endangered sea turtles by their shrimp harvesting industries and did not treat
differently those countries whose shrimp harvesting industries pose similar risks
to sea turtles.73 Furthermore, it claimed the measure was justified under the
Article XX exceptions relating to the protection of animal life and conserving

incidental killing of dolphins. Tuna 1, supra note 2, para 3.33. The United States also argued that the embargo
was allowable under Article XX (d), which provides an exception from other GATT obligations in cases where a
violation is "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the GATT
agreement." Tuna H, supra note 2, para. 5.41
69. Shrimp I, supra note 2; Shrimp II, supra note 2.
70. In 1991, 1993 and 1996 Guidelines were issued under the shrimp harvesting law, Section 609 of Public
Law 101-162. The 1996 Guidelines provided that in order to obtain certification under 609, a harvesting nation
must be accompanied by a declaration attesting that the shrimp was harvested either in the waters of a nation
currently certified under 609 or "under conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles." Allowable conditions
in harvesting countries are
a) shrimp harvested in an aquaculture facility in which the shrimp spend at least 30 days in ponds prior
to being harvested, b) shrimp harvested by commercial shrimp trawls using Turtle Excluder Devices
(TEDs) comparable in effectiveness to those required in the United States, c) shrimp harvested
exclusively by means that do not involve the retrieval of fishing nets by mechanical devices or by
vessels using gear that, in accordance with the U.S. program ...would not require TEDs, and d)
species of shrimp, such as the pandalid species harvested in areas where sea turtles do not occur.
Tuna 1,supra note 2, para. 5 (citing 1996 Guidelines, at 17,343).
71. Particularly, they argued that conditioning access to markets for a given product upon adoption of certain
policies by exporting States threatens the multilateral trading system and undermines the norm of multilateral
cooperation. If every member State were free to pursue its own trade solutions to what it perceives to be
environmental concerns, the challengers argued, the multilateral system would cease to exist. Tuna 1,supra note
2, paras. 35, 40.
72. Specifically, the challengers alleged that (1)a WTO Panel found that the United States negotiated an
agreement to protect and conserve sea turtles with some WTO members, but did not propose the negotiation of
an agreement with the challengers after it concluded its negotiations with other members, (2) phase-in periods
for the use of TEDs differed depending on the countries involved, and (3) section 609 discriminates between
products based on non-product-related processes and production methods. Tuna I, supra note 2, at 42.
73. Tuna I, supra note 2, paras. 20-21. Thus, the United States argued, only nations with shrimp industries
that harvest shrimp in waters where there is a likelihood of intercepting sea turtles, and that employ mechanical
equipment that harms sea turtles are subject to the import restrictions. Id. para. 21.
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exhaustible natural resources.7 4
3. Disparate Impact
A deceptively simple way to discriminate in foreign trade for the purpose of
protecting public health or the environment is to forbid the importation of a
product posing the public health or environmental harm sought to be protected
against. This type of legislation is neutral in treatment, both on its face and as
applied, between foreign and domestic suppliers. Instead, the legislation treats
classes of products, not suppliers, differently for ostensible health or environmental reasons. The result, however, can be that certain countries are disadvantaged
because the regulating (domestic) country and its suppliers has already adopted
the standard (e.g., ban on meat hormones) and switched to substitute products,
thereby internalizing the costs of that standard. Foreign suppliers may also be
disadvantaged if their industrial output consists primarily of the product (e.g.,
luxury car) that is targeted for prohibition or a higher regulatory burden, while a
competitive domestic product (e.g., economy cars) enjoys more favorable regulatory or tax treatment ostensibly on account of its environment or health friendliness.
The Meat Hormones and Asbestos cases provide examples of such legislation.
The Meat Hormones dispute involved several European Union directives forbidding the marketing or import of animals and animal meat containing natural and
artificial growth-enhancing hormones.7 5 The United States challenged these
directives under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement).76 The SPS Agreement seeks to distinguish between
acceptable and non-acceptable measures protecting animal, plant, or human
health by forcing nations to base their policies either on an established international standards or scientific findings of adverse human or animal health effects

74. Id. paras. 26-29.
75. See Meat Hormones, supra note 2. The hormones involved were the naturally occurring oestradiol- 17,
progesterone, testosterone, or the artificially created trenbolone acetate, zeronol, and melengestrol acetate.
Report of the Panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA, para.
8.2 (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Meat Hormones Panel Report].
76. See SPS Agreement, supra note 8. The SPS agreement was designed to help reduce the incidence of
non-tariff trade barriers used ostensibly to help protect human, animal or plant life within the importing
country's borders. The SPS Agreement helps define when a country can avail itself of the exception from
substantive GATT violations under Article XX(b), which provides a general exception from GATT substantive
requirements for measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health. Meat Hormones Panel
Report, supra note 75, para. 8.38. However, provisions of the SPS Agreement also impose "substantive"
obligations which go "significantly beyond and are additional to the requirements for invocation of Article
XX(b)." Id. These obligations are intended to promote the "harmonization" of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures between members and to "improve the human health and phytosanitary" conditions in all member
States. Id. Thus, while Article XX(b) provides for a general exception that can be invoked to justify an GATT
violation, the SPS Agreement provides for specific obligations to be met in order for a member to enact or
maintain specific types of measures, namely sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Id. para. 8.39.
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(i.e., risk assessments). 7 While the EU claimed that its directives met the SPS
Agreement standards, the United States asserted that the EU had not adduced any
evidence to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide risk to human health from
the use of the six hormones in question. The United States maintained that the
prohibition was simply disguised protectionism designed to benefit European
beef producers, while the European Union has insisted that it is a sensible public
health measure designed to protect its citizens against the possible risks of
ingesting hormone residues. Estimates of losses to United States exporters ranged
from U.S. $100-500 million annually, while European beef producers and other
countries where hormones do not play a very large role in beef production
welcomed the lessened U.S. competition.7 8
The Asbestos case involved France's ban on the sale or import of asbestos and
asbestos-containing products in its marketplace. Canada challenged the ban as a
violation, inter alia, of the national treatment provision and the prohibition on
import bans and quotas. Prior to the ban, Canada exported 20,000 to 40,000 tons
of chrysotile fibers to France each year, two-thirds of French imports of such
products. 79 Canada argued that its exported asbestos-containing products and
France's substitute asbestos products (made domestically) were "like products"
within the meaning of the national treatment provision of Article III, and the
French were therefore discriminating against the Canadian products. 80 Canada
alleged that the French government was using the ban to protect domestic
manufacturers of the substitute products, which also have human health risks.8 '
77. Specifically, the measure must be (a) "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;" (b)
"based on scientific principles;" and (c) not be "maintained without sufficient scientific evidence." The trade
law or regulation is deemed to be "necessary" if it is based on "international standards, guidelines, or
recommendations." These rules may come from one of three already designated international organizations, or
from "other relevant international organizations open for membership to all [WTO] Members, as identified by
the Committee [on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the WTO]." On the other hand, if a nation wishes to
go beyond an international standard, it must demonstrate that the standard is scientifically justified or that the
measure is based on a risk analysis See SPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3.1 (requiring members to base
sanitary measures on international standards), art. 3.2 (presumes measures that conform to international
standards are consistent with GAT and SPS agreement), art. 3.3 (stipulates the conditions to be met for a WTO
member to enact or maintain certain sanitary measures which are not based on international standards), art. 5.1
(obliging members to base sanitary measure on a risk assessment if not based on an international standard), art.
5.3 (setting out factors a member needs to take into account in making assessment of risks).
78. George Rountree, Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the World Trade Organization'sDecision in the
Eurpean Union - United States Beef Dispute, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 607,610 (1999).
79. Report of the Panel, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, W'T/DS I35/R, para. 3.8 (Sept. 18, 2000).
80. Id. para. 8.84.
81. Id. paras. 3.10-. 11. A related category of disparate impact cases involve a domestic measure that imposes
marketing or other regulatory requirements that disproportionately disfavor foreign producers. In United States
- Measures Affecting Malt and Other Beverages, for example, a pre-WTO panel reviewed the legality of various
State laws affecting the sale of liquor that had a disparate impact on foreign producers. By way of example, the
case involved among other State measures an Oklahoma statute that provided that beer over 3.2% alcohol by
weight is classified as intoxicating liquor and is sold for off-premises consumption only in packages under a
package store license. By contrast, the statute provided that beer containing not more than 3.2% alcohol is
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Part will articulate how these doctrines, and the anti-discrimination
embody, are applied to the three categories of cases in a way that
negative integration goals of the GATT while sheltering domestic
to the fullest extent possible.

IV. THE WTO's APPLICATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION NORMS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
AND PUBLIC HEALTH LEGISLATION: THE SEARCH FOR COVERT PROTECTIONISM

A.

TOWARDS A SLIDING SCALE OF SCRUTINY

In this Part, we survey the jurisprudence of GATT, in which the potential
conflict between what we call "public-interest regarding" values, such as environmental protection and public health, and free trade guarantees has arisen. Our
thesis, again, is that because it is a negative integration contract, containing a
series of negative covenants, the GATT necessarily constrains the role of its
adjudicatory body, and the WTO/DSB has been developing an anti-discrimination jurisprudence that roots out protectionism up to the boundary where
countervailing domestic interests preclude supranational intrusion into the domestic lawmaking process. A discernible jurisprudential framework emerges out of
the WTO/DSB's adjudication of challenges by importing trade nations claiming
that domestic environmental and health regulations discriminate against them.
This framework seeks to resolve the trade conflict in a manner that respects the
negative integration character of the GATT by limiting the jurisprudential inquiry
to flushing out covert protectionism, using an ends-means analysis. In turn, the
application of the ends-means test varies depending on the extent to which
invalidating the challenged measure accords with the negative integration goals
of the GATT and, correlatively, the extent to which such invalidation would
require the WTO to thrust itself into the domestic legal landscape of the
defendant State, thereby taking into account all relevant circumstances in the
case, including the type of policy challenged and the strength of the asserted
policy interest. Applying these considerations, as will be discussed below, a
regulation that facially discriminates against foreign goods, while favoring the
same or similar domestic goods, will garner the most scrutiny. A measure whose
regulatory distinction is neither status-based nor coercive will garner the most
deference. Scrutiny toward regulatory coercion of extraterritorial measures falls
somewhere in between the strict scrutiny applied to facially discriminatory
measures and the significant deference afforded to facially neutral measures.

classified as a nonintoxicating beverage and is sold for off-premises consumption only in packages at licensed
retail stores. Canadian beer tended to have a higher alcohol content than U.S. beer. Canadian beer manufacturers, then, were disproportionately denied access to a wider range of outlets. The Canadian government instituted
the GATT proceedings against the United States, arguing that the ban violated the national treatment provision
of Article I1.See Report of the Panel, United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June
19, 1992, B.I.S.D. 39S/206, (1992) [hereinafter Malt Beverages].
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B. DISPARATE TREATMENT

1. Applying Strict Scrutiny
In disparate treatment cases the negative integration goals of the GATT apply
at their fullest, and correlatively the national sovereignty interest is at its lowest.
The covenant not to engage in disparate treatment is the essence of the GATT's
negative integration enterprise, and the disparate treatment cases feature domestic measures that threaten GATT integration on a fundamental level. In entering
GATT, countries clearly relinquish their domestic sovereign right to single out
foreign products for disparate, less favorable treatment as compared to "like" or
"competitive" domestic products. In a disparate treatment case, then, the WTO
has the lowest concern for national sovereignty and counter-majoritarian problems.
When a country adopts a disparate treatment measure, the WTO/DSB effectively engages in a form of "strict scrutiny" under which most regulations will
fail. Another way of articulating this scrutiny is that in a disparate treatment case,
the regulatory distinction creates a strong presumption that the defending State is
protecting the "like" or "competitive" domestic product in violation of the
GATT's negative integration goals. In both Thai Cigarettes and Reformulated
Gasoline, for example, the WTO/DSB found that the measures, either on their
face or as applied, violated the core disciplines of GATT because they treated
82
foreign products in a less favorable manner than their domestic counterparts.
Where this is the case, the WTO heavily scrutinizes the ends-means relationship
in light of the strong public policy goals (normally a listed Article XX exception)
underlying the regulation. The WTO will require the defending State to produce
compelling evidence that other, least trade-restrictive alternatives - ones that do
not distinguish between or differently treat foreign and domestic producers - do
not exist to achieve the same policy objective. The regulating country's failure to
explore such means and disregard of the costs of the regulatory distinction
constitutes prohibited discrimination.8 3

82. In Thai Cigarettes, the WTO found that the measure was in violation of Article XI's prohibition on bans,
quotas, licenses and similar measures on imported products. Thai-Cigarettes, supra note 2, para. 16. In
Reformulated Gasoline, the WTO found that chemically identical imported and domestic gasoline by definition
were "like products" under Article III and concluded that, as such, imported gasoline was treated "less
favorably" than domestic gasoline under the baseline establishment rule. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 2,
paras. 6.9-.14.
83. This conclusion that the measure is prohibited discrimination might be reached in one of two ways. First,
the measure might not satisfy the ends-means test of the applicable Article XX exception. See, e.g.,
Thai- Cigarettes, supra note 2 (not "necessary" to "protect human health or life" under exception (b)). However,
even if it does satisfy the exceptions' ends-means test, the application of the measure is still subject to the
ends-means analysis in the preamble, or chapeau, to Article XX. See, e.g., Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 2
(the failure of the U.S. to explore alternative courses of action or means constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction on international trade").
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2. The Search for Least Restrictive Alternatives
Recall that in Thai Cigarettes,Thailand sought to justify differential treatment
of foreign and domestic cigarettes as necessary to achieve the goal of reducing
the consumption of tobacco, citing the health hazards of smoking and the
attendant medical costs associated with those hazards.8 4 In spite of these hazards
and costs, however, Thailand had not instituted domestic safeguards or measures
85
comparable to an import prohibition with respect to domestic cigarettes.
Indeed, sales and exports of cigarettes and tobacco made in Thailand remained at
high levels. Given these facts, the WTO/DSB concluded that the import prohibition was not "necessary" to protect human life or health and hence not justifiable
under the Article XX(b) exception. It rejected Thailand's argument that competition between imported and domestic cigarettes would necessarily lead to an
increase in the total sales of cigarettes and that Thailand therefore had no option
but to prohibit cigarette imports. The WTO/DSB further concluded that the
measure at issue was "necessary" only if there were no alternative measures
consistent with the GATT, or "less inconsistent with it." Thailand had failed to
meet the least-GATT-inconsistent test because there were less restrictive trade measures
86
reasonably available to Thailand that would meet its public health concerns.
Similarly, the WTO/DSB found in Reformulated Gasoline that the United
States had more than one course of action available to it in achieving its clean air
goals, including the imposition of statutory baselines without discriminating
between domestic and imported gas producers. 87 It rejected the U.S. argument
that alternative means were not feasible for administrative reasons, such as the
impracticability of verification and enforcement of foreign baselines.8 8 The

84. A main objective of the Act was to ensure that cigarettes were produced in quantity just sufficient to
satisfy domestic demand, without increasing such demand. Thailand feared, further, that prohibiting the
production of tobacco domestically might lead to worst public health consequences, such as the production and
consumption of more harmful narcotic drugs. See Thai-Cigarettes,supra note 2.
85. Thailand, however, attempted to defend the measure by demonstrating that there was a ban on
advertising for both domestic and foreign cigarettes and that no new cigarette factories had been built in the last
12 years that would have expanded the State-controlled cigarette industry. Id. para. 33.
86. For instance, Thai concerns about the quality of cigarettes consumed in Thailand could be met with strict
non-discriminatory labeling and ingredient disclosure regulations. Its concerns about the quantity of cigarettes,
the WTO/DSB reasoned, could be addressed by bans on advertisement. Lastly, Thailand's concerns about the
supply of cigarettes could be taken care of by its own government monopoly, the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, by
regulating the overall supply of cigarettes, their prices, and their retail availability so long as it does not treat
domestic cigarettes less favorably. See Thai-Cigarettes,supra note 2, paras. 77-81.
87. Citing two such alternatives, it noted that all foreign and domestic refiners could have been granted the
option to calculate an individual baseline or alternatively all refiners, domestic and foreign, could have been
assigned a statutory baseline. Reformulated Gasoline, supranote 2, para. 25.
88. Specifically, the United States argued that it would have been difficult to enforce these alternative means
on foreign soil. As gasoline is a fungible commodity, it would have been difficult to trace gasoline to specific
refineries to ensure that baselines were complied with. Also, the United States would be unable to issue
subpoenas for documents in the event they suspected non-compliance, or to claim against refineries operated by
foreign governments because of sovereign immunity. Id. paras. 26-27.
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WTO/DSB was not convinced that data from foreign refiners was inherently less
susceptible to established techniques of checking, verification, assessment, and
enforcement than data for other trade in goods subject to U.S. regulation.8 9
Notably, the WTO/DSB found that the United States had not explored cooperative arrangements with foreign refiners and their governments to mitigate or
address these administration and enforcement issues. 9° Failure to explore these
alternative means and disregard of costs for foreign refiners from imposition of
the baselines constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction on international trade."
Thus, in disparate treatment cases, it is practically as if any less trade
restrictive means of achieving the domestic purpose would defeat the measure.
The type of case where disparate treatment would be upheld is the case where the
regulating government essentially has no choice but to target imports. For
example, if French beef was widely infected with anthrax, which apparently is a
common animal disease, and the United States banned the distribution in this
country of French beef, it would be hard to argue that there is a less trade
restrictive method of protecting U.S. public health. Conversely, there would be
no doubt that the measure was not a form of covert protectionism.
3. The Strongest Presumption of Protectionism
Importantly, the presence of disparate treatment often will alleviate the WTO's
concern that it is engaged in positive integration review that interferes with
domestic, non-trade concerns. In Thai Cigarettes,for example, the Thai government did not simply ban cigarettes; it banned foreign cigarettes only. The WTO
did nothing to hinder Thailand's activity to combat the health risks associated
with tobacco risks in an even-handed manner, including through neutral education and regulation programs. The WTO, then, was able to proceed with a
substantial degree of comfort that it was rooting out the obvious protectionist
effect of the challenged measure, all the while respecting Thailand's right to
implement an anti-tobacco campaign of its choice. In Reformulated Gasoline,
likewise, eliminating the disparate treatment of foreign refiners did not truly
endanger the domestic regulatory goals of the United States. The United States
could simply work out a cooperative compliance procedure that would insure that
its substantive regulatory goals are achieved. Put otherwise, the availability of an
obvious, less-trade restrictive means of achieving the regulatory goal lessened the
likelihood that invalidating the domestic measure would deprive the United
States of a regulatory choice.
Thus, in the disparate treatment category of cases, the WTO/DSB has the
strongest treaty basis for invalidating a challenged measure and the lowest

89. Id.
90. Id. para. 27.
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likelihood of unduly interfering with the domestic lawmaking process. The type
of measure challenged - i.e., the classification of foreign products in a less
favorable regulatory category as counterpart domestic products - lies at the core
of the GATT negative integration covenant. In this type of case, the presumption
of protectionism is at its highest. The countervailing domestic policy interests
may normally be achieved with relative ease or additional cost. In these
circumstances, the WTO/DSB has relatively high freedom of movement to root
out the protectionism involved in the challenged measure by aggressively
applying the ends-means test, all the while respecting the defendant State's
authority to regulate.
C.

REGULATORY COERCION

1. A Less Exacting Scrutiny
Regulatory coercion cases also implicate a covert protectionism analysis that is
grounded in the goals of the GATT. As will be discussed in greater detail below,
these cases involve attempts by the sanctioning State to heighten the regulatory
burden on businesses operating in the target State. However, the target State's
relatively lax regulatory environment is part of the comparative advantage that
businesses operating in those jurisdictions enjoy. By attempting to deprive those
businesses of such comparative advantage, the sanctioning State is in effect
seeking to level the playing field and give a boost to its domestic industry.
Further, the extraterritorial nature of the measure reduces the extent to which the
WTO intervenes in the domestic lawmaking process. On the other hand, to the
extent the WTO/DSB is depriving a State of its ability to target foreign nations
with bad environmental habits, it is harming that nation's environmental policy.
In order to lessen the impact of this intrusion into domestic lawmaking, the WTO
engages in a type of scrutiny less exacting than that applied in disparate treatment
cases. Here, the WTO will require the defendant State to engage in even-handed
negotiations and show flexibility in applying performance-based environmental
goals to other countries. The WTO will presume that the defendant State is
engaged in covert protectionism if it does not pursue these less trade restrictive
means of achieving the stated domestic goal, but it will accommodate the
national sovereignty concerns at issue by upholding the extraterritorial measure if
the defendant State does negotiate even-handedly and shows flexibility.
2. Inferring Protectionism
The regulatory coercion cases directly implicate important GATT interests. In
attempting to level the playing field by applying the same regulatory requirement
to all product suppliers, the sanctioning State is, in effect, depriving the target
State of a regulatory comparative advantage. The cost of goods in the target State
includes, in addition to raw materials, labor, etc., the cost of complying with
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applicable regulations. Businesses in the target State may produce goods more
cheaply if, say, they have to spend less money to comply with environmental or
worker safety regulations. The sanctioning State is in effect protecting its
domestic industry's ability to comply with domestic regulation without losing its
competitive edge on that account. By way of illustration, when the United States
in the Shrimp case attempts to require Malaysia to use TEDs, the United States is
forcing Malaysia to give up the comparative advantage inherent in less restrictive
environmental regulation, and it is furthering the U.S. domestic shrimp industry's
ability to compete without facing the disadvantage inherent in higher compliance
costs. Specialization based on comparative advantage, and trade in goods free of
government obstacles, are basic GATT principles of comparative advantage, and
regulatory coercion infringes on these principles. 9 '
Thus, where the sanctioning State is rigid in its application of the regulatory
scheme against other trading partners, particularly where it fails to take into
account specific conditions prevailing in exporting countries, an inference of
protectionism arises. The Tuna and Shrimp/Turtle controversies illustrate the
WTO's treatment of rigid coercion schemes, which give rise to an inference that
the sanctioning State is more interested in protecting its domestic industry by
leveling regulatory environments than achieving the stated goal. In Tuna II, the
WTO/DSB concluded that a measure requiring a defined change of policy within
foreign jurisdictions that was enacted ostensibly in order to protect endangered
dolphins, was not necessary to achieve that goal.92 Similarly, in Shrimp I, even
though the means-end relationship between the measure and the stated goal of
conserving sea turtles was an "observably close and real one," the WTO/DSB
found that implementation of the measure required exporting countries to adopt a
regulatory program that is not merely comparable, but rather essentially the same
as that applied to U.S. shrimp trawl vessels, even in countries where different
conditions prevail.9 3 Any flexibility in the statute, the WTO/DSB noted, had been
effectively eliminated in its implementation.94 Hence, the United States seemed
more interested in influencing other countries to adopt the same comprehensive
regulatory regime and the costs associated with the regulatory standards than the
declared policy of protecting and conserving sea turtles.9 5

91. Note also that the target State's national sovereignty is threatened by the sanctioning State, such that the
WTO/DSB may have fewer qualms in curtailing the sanctioning State's own sovereignty.
92. The MMPA provisions at issue provided that intermediary nations that both import yellowfin tuna and
yellowfin tuna products, and export those products to the United States "must certify and provide reasonable
proof that it has not imported products subject to the direct prohibition within the preceding six months." Tuna
If, supra note 2, para. 7.
93. Shrimp I, supra note 2, paras. 141, 168.
94. Id. para. 161.
95. The WTO noted that shrimp caught in uncertified countries would be excluded from the United States
even if commercial shrimp trawl vessels used technology comparable in effectiveness to those utilized in the
United States. Id. para. 165.
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3. Extraterritoriality as a Justification for Scrutiny
The extraterritorial nature of the challenged measure in regulatory coercion
cases alleviates the WTO's interference with the domestic legislative process. As
will be elaborated below, the WTO does limit in regulatory coercion cases the
contracting States' sovereign ability to enact measures that target nations with
bad environmental habits. However, such measures may be applied in the
domestic realm free of any supranational trade interference. Put otherwise,
although the WTO interferes with the United States' ability to police the global
environment, it does nothing in a case such as Shrimp/Turtle to invalidate the
United States' attempt to police its own environment. This makes it easier for the
WTO to root out the protectionism embedded in the measure, all the while
remaining confident that it is not thrusting itself into domestic lawmaking.
Similar to the disparate treatment cases, the inquiry here is whether there are
reasonable, least trade restrictive alternatives to achieving the policy objective
other than coercing the importing country into adopting an expensive regulatory
program. In Tuna I, the WTO/DSB found that the "primary" tuna embargo
against Mexico violated the GATT because the United States had not exhausted
all GATT-consistent options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphinprotection objectives, particularly through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements (which the WTO opined to be desirable in view of the fact
that dolphins roam the waters of many States and high seas).9 6 Similarly, in
Shrimp I, the WTO concluded that the United States failed to engage in serious
multilateral negotiations with many of the targeted nations and instead arbitrarily
demanded that the nations adopt U.S. environmental standards to avoid trade
restrictions. 7 The WTO concluded that the United States had to provide all
exporting countries similar opportunities to negotiate an international agreement
if it were really serious about protecting sea turtles.98 The United States' failure to
seek less trade restrictive measures essentially evinced its protectionist purpose:
"if you are really interested in sea turtle protection, why not act in the same
manner that you acted vis-a-vis other countries (such as the Latin American
countries that the United States signed a treaty with)?"
On the other hand, Shrimp/Turtle H upheld the U.S. government's revised
96. Even if the embargo was the only resort reasonably available to the United States, this particular measure
was also not "primarily aimed" at conservation of dolphins given that the United States linked the maximum
incidental dolphin taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular period to the taking rate actually
recorded for U.S. fishermen during the same period. Consequently, Mexican authorities could not know
whether, at a given point in time, their conservation policies conformed to the U.S. conservation standards. Such
a limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions seemed to be unexplainable by anything other than
protectionism. Tuna 1,supra note 2, para. 5.30.
97. Shrimp I, supra note 2, paras. 171-72.
98. Id. para. 172. In addition, the tribunal's conclusion was further solidified by the rigidity of the measure i.e., failure to distinguish among countries where different conditions prevail - and lack of transparency in the
certification process. Id. para. 177-84.
HeinOnline -- 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 666 2002-2003

2003]

THE

WTO's

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE

guidelines for implementation of its shrimp harvesting import ban which, it
found, does not condition market access on adoption of the same regulatory
program. It found the revised program more flexible in granting certification to
countries that adopted a regulatory program comparable in effectiveness in
protecting sea turtles as the United States' program or to a country that can
demonstrate that its shrimp fishing environment does not pose a threat of
incidental capture of sea turtles. 99 As to the challenger, Malaysia, the tribunal

found that the revised guidelines permitted the United States to take into account
the specific conditions of Malaysian shrimp production and of the Malaysian sea
turtle conservation program.
4. Restraint and Deference Toward National Sovereignty
In the regulatory coercion cases, the negative integration purpose of the GATT
is less at play than in the disparate treatment cases, and the defendant has more of
an interest in preserving its national sovereignty than in the disparate treatment
cases. That is, the defending State is using trade sanctions to compel a change in
the environmental, health, or other policy of another sovereign State. There is a
general principle of international relations that requires States to negotiate with
others before imposing unilateral trade sanctions.' 0 ' The GATT, however, does
not incorporate this principle. Therefore, to that extent, the WTO is asked in
regulatory coercion cases to deprive States of a sovereign right, albeit one that
violates other principles of international relations, without a basis in the text of
the GATT. Trade sanctions further a legitimate State interest in environmental
protection. For example, sea turtles "don't carry a passport" such that international coercion or concerted action is the only way to take care of this global
problem. To the extent the WTO/DSB is depriving the United States of its ability
to target foreign nations with bad environmental habits, it is harming the U.S.
environmental policy. The WTO is thus encouraging multilateral action by
depriving the defending State of its sanctioning power, but because the GATT is
not a positive integration treaty there is less legitimacy in this exercise in
encouraging harmonization than in the cases where the DSB is rooting out
disparate treatment.
Recognizing its lack of legitimacy in forcing international negotiation, in
Shrimp II the WTO/DSB upheld the U.S.-revised guidelines for implementation
of the shrimp harvesting import ban. It found adequate the United States' good
02
faith efforts to reach international agreements with the challenging countries.

99. Shrimp II, supra note 2, paras. 59-61, § b.
100. Id. paras. 61-62.
101. Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of
Free Trade and Protectionof the Environment, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 407-14 (1993).
102. Shrimp I1, supra note 2, para. 133.
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The WTO found the United States' negotiations with the various countries to be
comparable - that is, the United States devoted similar efforts, resources, and
energies in the various negotiations from one forum of negotiation to another. As
such, the fact that the measure was "unilateral" was not fatal to the legitimacy of
the measure, the WTO reasoned, because the United States could respect its
obligation to treat its trading partners in a nondiscriminatory manner by negotiating seriously and in 0good
faith without having reached an actual agreement with
3
any trading partner. 1
Thus, the WTO/DSB, by requiring evidence of even-handed negotiations and
flexibility in applying performance-based environmental goals to other countries,
is essentially fleshing out covert protectionism. At the same time, because of the
higher concern for national sovereignty and the lesser implications of the goals of
the GATT, the WTO/DSB properly engages in a lower, perhaps "intermediate"
level of scrutiny in the regulatory coercion cases. As such, the WTO/DSB will
find no discrimination where comparable efforts are made to negotiate with
various countries, access to the domestic market is not conditioned on the
adoption of the same program, and the challenged regulations permit a degree of
flexibility that enables consideration of particular conditions prevailing in the
exporting countries.
D.

DISPARATE IMPACT PROVISIONS

1. Lowest Level of Scrutiny
GATT interests are the least implicated in the disparate impact cases, and the
national sovereignty concerns of the regulating State are at their highest. The
GATT, at its core, permits countries to adopt the level of regulation that they
choose. So a neutral regulation, in the sense of its treatment of domestic and
foreign products, should presumptively not violate the GATT's anti-discrimination norms. In these cases, the degree of disparity in impact on a foreign producer,
alone, does not trigger the WTO's scrutiny of a measure. 1°4 That is, the
WTO/DSB considers evidence of a disparate impact on a foreign producer's
comparative advantage as simply a starting, but not an ending, point to its search
for covert protectionism.
2. Objective Basis for Classification Sufficient to Uphold It
In such cases, the WTO/DSB engages in a lower level of scrutiny, asking only
whether there is an objective basis for distinguishing between classes of products.

103. Id.

104. In Meat Hormones, the WTO rejected arguments that the degree of disparity in levels of health
protection between certain various hormones, alone, constitutes discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade. However, the degree of disparity may be so strong as to lead to an inference that the measure
was more likely than not motivated by protectionism. Meat Hormones, supra note 2.
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Where there is, the inquiry essentially ends there. Even when other alternatives to
achieving the asserted policy goal exist, the regulating country need not justify its
refusal to adopt those alternative means. However, when there is not an objective
basis between distinguishing classes of products, the disparate treatment of such
products triggers similar scrutiny as the other categories of discriminatory
regulation. As such, the measure is treated like the other two types of discriminatory measures and is subjected to a tighter ends-means fit.
The EU beef-hormone ban violated GATT's SPS agreement in the Meat
Hormones case precisely because it was not based on either an objective
international standard or a risk assessment that included an evaluation of the
potential adverse impact of hormone residues on human health. 01 5 In a nod to the
importance of State sovereignty, and the limited adjudicatory role of the WTO,
the tribunal emphasized that trading members have the right to go beyond
international standards of health protection and that this right was important to
the autonomy of governments. 10 6 However, when a member does seek to go
beyond an existing international standard, it must show that its election of a more
stringent standard is scientifically justified.' 0 7 The WTO/DSB found that the EU
had not shown sufficient scientific justification for its ban on the import of
hormone treated beef.' 0 8
The inquiry into risk assessments, and other objective benchmarks for treating
different classes of products differently, was central to the WTO's analysis of
"like products" in the Asbestos case. There, the tribunal found that the French ban
on asbestos was consistent with GATT's national treatment obligation once
105. The requirement that a SPS measure be "based on" an international standard is a more positive
integrationist stance than the other GATT provisions seem to embrace. However, the WTO/DSB in Meat
Hormones made clear that the agreement does not so constrain a nation's sovereignty, but instead is part of its
anti-discrimination guarantee. It stated:
The ultimate goal of the harmonization of SPS measures is to prevent the use of such measures for
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members or as a disguised restriction on international trade, without preventing Members from adopting or enforcing measure which are both
"necessary to protect" human life and health and "based on scientific principles," and without
requiring them to change their appropriate level of protection.
Meat Hormones, supra note 2. Taken in this context, the WTO found that risk assessment requirements
under Article 5.1 of the SPS, as well as "sufficient scientific principles" under Article 2.2, are "essential for
maintaining the delicate and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS Agreement between the shared, but
sometimes competing, interests of promoting international trade and of protecting the life and health of
human beings." Id.
106. The WTO/DSB declared: "We do not believe that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic
conclusion that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in the SPS measure." Id. para. 194.
107. Scientific justification exists if a WTO member determines, based on "available scientific information,"
that the international standard in question is sufficient to achieve the State's chosen level of protection. In other
words, the member must conduct a risk assessment.
108. The EU subsequently announced that it would perform a new scientific assessment of the risks from
hormone treated beef. After reviewing seventeen studies and other scientific data, the EU confirmed in 2002 that
the use of growth hormones in beef poses potential health risks to consumers. See http://www.sunsonline.org/
trade/process/followup/1998/03170198.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2003).
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human health risks were considered in part of the analysis of whether Canadian
asbestos products were "like" French substitute products. The WTO adopted a
market-based approach to the "likeness" inquiry by applying criteria of "physical
properties," "end-uses," "consumers' tastes and habits," and "tariff classification."' 0 9 The physical properties of the products became the most influential
factor in the tribunal's analysis because these properties are "likely to influence
the competitive relationship between products in the marketplace," thereby most
closely related to flushing out whether the measure was really disguised protectionism. As such, it reasoned, evidence related to health risk should be considered
under the physical properties (and consumer's taste) analysis because the risk of a
product may directly correlate to its physical properties." 0 The WTO concluded,
under the physical properties test, the Canadian asbestos and French substitute
fibers were not "like products" because substitute fibers were not found to be
dangerous to human health."'
3. A "Reasonable" Relation Between Ends and Means
Even though the WTO/DSB held that the French ban on the whole was
consistent with the GATT's national treatment obligation, it nevertheless considered whether the measure was "necessary" to protect human life or health under
the Article XX exception. Its analysis of "necessary" suggests that future
adjudications will need to take into account whether "reasonably available"
alternatives exist to achieve the health objectives. Several factors must be taken
into account - including the difficulty of implementation, the extent to which the
measure contributes to the realization of the end pursued, and how vital or
important the common interests or values pursued. 1 2 Based on its analysis in
Meat Hormones, however, a challenger will have a difficult time proving that

reasonably available alternatives exist once the importing country has justified its
measure by an objective assessment. Here, the tribunal rejected the argument that
"controlled use" of asbestos is a reasonably available alternative. It found that
France could not reasonably employ just any alternative measure if that measure
would involve a continuation of the very risk that the measure seeks to halt. Such
an alternative measure would, in effect, prevent France from achieving its chosen
level of health protection.

109. Although the tribunal made clear that these criteria simply provide a framework within which to
analyze the likeness of products, and that all evidence must be taken into account before rendering a verdict.
Asbestos, supra note 2.
110. Id.
11. In the tribunal's view, application of the four other tests led to the conclusion that the products were not
"like" products. The WTO/DSB also analyzed whether cement containing asbestos is a "like product" to cement
containing substitute fiber using the same criteria for likeness. It found that Canada had not established the basis
for holding the products were "like products." Id.
112. Id.; see also Korea Beef, supra note 44, para. 163.
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Thus, a regulatory restriction is deemed non-discriminatory when the disparity
in the impact on foreign products is justified by some sort of objective measure
(e.g., risk assessment data) demonstrating a reasonable relationship to a legitimate national interest, such as public health or environmental protection. Moreover, the stronger the interest, the more likely the DSB will accept that the
measure is necessary to achieve the asserted end." 13 If the WTO required a tighter
relation between means and end or used disparate impact as a proxy for
protectionist motive, 1 4 it would come dangerously close to questioning the
substantive judgment of the regulating State. In other words, its jurisprudence
would become closer to an ECJ-like review of laws that burden trade merely by
creating disparate regulatory environments. This would thrust the WTO much
deeper into the role of a positive judicial integrator, without institutional,
political, or historical support for the activity. By deferring to the State's
substantive judgment, once a firm foundation for that judgment has been
established, the WTO properly respects its institutional and other limitations.
V.

TESTING THE MODEL: THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST PROXIMITY

A.

THE PROBLEM

The WTO's anti-discrimination jurisprudence should, as demonstrated above,
strike the proper balance between fostering free trade and protecting national
sovereignty. However, the model is at risk of breaking down in some scenarios.
There may arise cases where a legitimate State interest unrelated to economic
protectionism is so intertwined with a State interest in protecting the domestic
economy from competition as to make it impossible for a judicial body such as
the WTO/DSB to distinguish between the two drives for the legislation. In these
cases, the WTO/DSB may not invalidate the challenged legislation without
interfering to a substantial extent with national sovereignty and defacto requiring
the defendant State to engage in positive integration. At the same time, if the
WTO/DSB does not intervene, it permits the defendant State to apply a measure
that shelters domestic industry from competition.
B.

ILLUSTRATION: THE PATENT RIGHTS/AIDS CASE

The patent rights/AIDS case described in the Introduction illustrates this
potential conflict. In that case, the challenged measure involved disparate
treatment of foreign and domestic producers. The measure, though, reflected a
mixture of health and protectionist concerns. As posited in the Introduction, the
defendant State enacted the challenged measure in large part to further the
governmental interest in helping its AIDS population. However, the very act of
113. Id.
114. Malt Beverages, supra note 81.
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protecting the AIDS population had the effect of giving a regulatory boost to the
domestic manufacturers. Indeed, while most legislators were aware of the
incidental protectionist effect of the legislation, some voted in its favor precisely
because they sought to further a State interest in aiding domestic manufacturers
(rather than AIDS patients).' 15
1. Applying the Law: Letting Stand a Partially Protectionist Policy or
Infringing on Sovereign Rights
Applying the principles laid out in such cases as Reformulated Gasoline and
Thai Cigarettes, the WTO should ask whether there were other, less trade
burdensome or restrictive alternatives to achieve the desired goal, with a view to
ferreting out protectionism." 16 As described in Part IV, in disparate treatment
cases, the WTO heavily scrutinizes the ends-means relationship between the
measure at issue and a strong public policy goal. The defendant State must
produce compelling evidence that other, less trade restrictive alternatives are not
reasonably available to achieve the same policy objective.
In our hypothetical case, the WTO may conclude that there are less trade
restrictive ways for the defendant State to achieve the desired goal, or that the
defendant State was not mindful enough of the costs imposed on the foreign
manufacturers. The WTO could, for example, conclude that the defendant State
should raise additional taxes to provide its population with treatment without
suspending patent rights. While this argument would be hard to make with
respect to a State with very limited resources, it would have some strength with
respect to a country such as Brazil, which was a defendant in the proceedings
filed in the WTO by the United States relating to the suspension of patent rights
for AIDS drugs.' 7 The defendant State may also seek cooperation with the
foreign drug companies to lower the price of drugs. Indeed, U.S. drug manufacturers offered to lower their prices in response to the public health emergency in
some of their markets. Requiring concerted action would be consistent with the
DSB's ruling in Shrimp/Turtle, and the DSB may rule that the defendant State
may not apply the challenged measure without at least first seeking a cooperative
solution to the problem at hand.
'

115. It should be noted that the case raises the issue of what constitutes a "protectionist motive." Does the
conscious awareness by some legislators of the protectionist effect of the measure at issue amount to a
protectionist motive? Or should the DSB require some evidence of actual protectionist motive? In our view,
such a subjective inquiry into the frames of mind of the legislators is fraught with uncertainty, and the disparate
treatment of foreign and national products is the objective evidence of a protectionist motive that triggers the
DSB's scrutiny.
116. We are assuming that the case would be decided under the national treatment provisions of Article II1.
Although a similar analysis would likely obtain under the intellectual property provisions of the GATT, we are
not addressing that aspect of the treaty so as to confine our analysis to the legal provisions at issue in the cases
discussed throughout this article.
117. The United States ultimately withdrew its action.
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However, if the WTO followed the analysis it normally applies in disparate
treatment cases and searched for any less trade restrictive alternative available, it
would run the risk of severely intruding into the national sovereignty of the
defending State. First, the WTO would interfere with the domestic agenda and
revenue raising policies of that State. It would tell the State that the public health
goal of providing AIDS drugs at a manageable cost requires a reshuffling of its
tax priorities. Also, the WTO would put in danger the public health interests of
the State. If the State did not have the political will to shift revenue raising, then a
portion of its sick population would suffer dire consequences (the negative health
effects would likely be felt during the transition period necessary to raise the
necessary revenues).
At the same time, the DSB could not uphold the challenged measure without
letting stand a partially protectionist policy. A ruling in favor of the defendant
State would mean that, provided that the measure furthers a sufficient health or
other legitimate interest, the relevant domestic industry (here, pharmaceutical
companies) could benefit from overt regulatory protection against foreign competition. This is arguably the functional equivalent of levying an impermissible
tariff on the imported drugs and using the revenue from this measure to pay for
them. As explained above, the national treatment provisions of the GATT seek at
their core to prevent contracting parties from achieving, through domestic
regulation, economic goals that are functionally equivalent to tariffs. Letting
stand the challenged measure in our hypothetical case would undermine the
foundational principles of the GATT.
2. Explaining the Problem: Imperfect Contracts
The crux of the problem is that negative integration contracts are by definition
imperfect. There are relatively easy cases, such as Vodka/Shochu, where the
protectionist motive is rather clear and no countervailing, legitimate domestic
purpose is apparent. There, a tribunal may, using judicial tools, identify a
protectionist motive with relative certainty and direct the defendant State to
discontinue discrimination. There are other cases, such as Reformulated Gasoline, where a legitimate State interest is mixed with protectionism, but the WTO
may direct the defendant State to eliminate protectionism without unduly
interfering with the achievement of the legitimate goal because relatively simple
adjustments (i.e., setting up verification procedures abroad) are possible. In yet
another category of cases (regulatory coercion), the extra-territorial nature of the
behavior that the defendant State seeks to combat makes it relatively easier for the
WTO to choose free trade without undue interference with national sovereignty.
In a borderline disparate treatment case, such as our patent rights/AIDS case,
the close proximity between the legitimate and the illegitimate State interests
makes it simply impossible to eliminate protectionism without defacto requiring
positive integration. Again, this is because the elimination of the protectionist
HeinOnline -- 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 673 2002-2003

THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:633

policy through the enactment of a less trade restrictive measure would require
such a high cost on the defendant State as to amount to the imposition of a
specific domestic policy on that State. Put in another way, there is a boundary
where the licit and illicit motives become so intertwined as to make it almost
impossible for a tribunal to strike down discrimination without dictating national
policy. Unlike Reformulated Gasoline, the WTO has very little room in our
hypothetical case to issue a negative injunction against the protectionist interest
without effectively coupling such injunction with a positive prescription. This is
because, in Reformulated Gasoline, the legitimate and illegitimate interests are in
much less close proximity than in our hypothetical case, such that the WTO has
room to prod the defendant State to cease protectionism with relatively minimal
intrusion on its sovereign rights.
3. A Possible Solution
How should the WTO decide the patent/AIDS case? Our contention is that the
WTO should make a case-by-case, common law-type evaluation of the extent to
which rooting out protectionism will interfere with national sovereignty and
endanger the relationship between the supranational and the national spheres of
competence. The issue of interference with national sovereignty would require an
evaluation by the WTO of the extent to which invalidating the challenged
measure amounts to positive integration. In turn, such evaluation would entail an
inquiry into the strength of the legitimate domestic motive and the cost and
difficulty that would be inherent in achieving the goal in a less trade restrictive
way. In other words, at the same time as the WTO requires member States to
consider the trade costs of discriminatory legislation mixed with a proper motive,
the WTO should itself consider the cost to the defendant State of achieving a
legitimate goal with a lesser burden on trade.
In our hypothetical case, the magnitude of the AIDS pandemic would militate
in favor of letting the challenged measure stand. Similarly, the extent of the
interference with the domestic regulatory process that a decision adverse to the
defendant State would entail tends to support judicial restraint. Again, this is not a
case where a bit of "tweaking" with domestic regulatory goals will not severely
undermine a policy of the defendant State. Here, depriving the defendant State of
the ability to suspend patent rights may severely undermine the ability of the
defendant State to achieve its regulatory goal. As already mentioned, there may
not be enough political will, or simply enough resources, to pay for the health
measure without targeting foreign interests. Even if the State made that regulatory choice, it may be required to shift resources away from other domestic
programs. The degree of positive integration and the correlated intrusion into
national sovereignty militate against supranational interference.
As to maintaining the proper relationship between the supranational and the
national spheres of competence, the reviewing tribunal would not only evaluate
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the strength of the domestic motive, but also the political and institutional
consequences of invalidating the national measure. As the European experience
demonstrates, integration of markets happens in leaps and bounds, prodded by
various institutional actors among whom the courts have a prominent role. In the
evolution of integration over time, the ECJ has sought as much as possible to
avoid "constitutional crises" where its mandate would be disobeyed on the
grounds that it unduly interferes with national sovereignty. Thus, after the
European Court faced an onslaught of criticism as a result of its assuming
jurisdiction to scrutinize, under trade principles, Sunday closing laws, strict
pornography standards, prohibition on certain sales practices such as door-todoor sales, limitations on advertising methods, and other measures, the Court
retreated to a less integrationist stance and sheltered from trade scrutiny (essentially) all laws not related to the characteristics of a product or its packaging.11 8
In our hypothetical case, political and institutional considerations also militate
in favor of judicial restraint. The WTO may ask the United States, in Reformulated Gasoline, to set up verification and compliance procedures, perhaps at the
cost of losing some "clean air," rather than treat foreign refiners differently, all the
while concluding its report with the express (and no doubt heartfelt) statement
that it is not telling the United States what level of environmental protection to
choose. The WTO may also tell the United States not to impose its policies on
Malaysia while advancing a politically defensible argument that it is not
preventing this country from conserving its resources.
If the WTO ruled against the defendant State in the patent rights/AIDS case, on
the other hand, it would open itself up to a barrage of criticism that it is choosing
trade over human life and unduly thrusting itself into the legislative process.
Because of the strength of the mixed (legitimate) motive, the WTO essentially
would be faced with a very legislative task of sorting out the extent to which the
defendant State may further its domestic health by other means. Such criticism
would mirror that levied against the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECJ by judges
and commentators who do not approve of these courts' "balancing jurisprudence." The criticism may or may not be legitimate in a highly integrated area or
federal State, but in the WTO context, there is by all account very little, if any,
democratic legitimacy in such deep supranational intervention in domestic
matters.
4. Negative Integration as a Theoretical Support for the Proposed Solution;
Striking the Proper Balance between Trade and Sovereignty
We have argued that the WTO has developed an anti-discrimination jurisprudence that respects the negative integration goals of the GATT and strikes, if

118. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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properly articulated and applied, the right balance between fostering trade and
preserving national sovereignty. It is crucial for the future of the WTO that it
respect the boundaries of its power at this stage of its historical evolution. As
explained above, the European experience demonstrates that integration comes
about in leaps and bounds out of the interaction between various supranational
and national actors. "Constitutional crises," where national actors reject the
integrationist drive of the supranational actors, pose the greatest danger to
continued integration. So long as it adheres relatively closely to its goal in rooting
out protectionism, the WTO should steer clear of a crisis with its contracting
parties and continue to push the global economy down the path of sustainable
integration.
Our argument should not be construed to mean that the GATT is a wonderfully
functional integration tool that does not threaten the sovereignty rights of its
contracting States and fundamental values in such fields as labor, environment, or
health protection. The irony is that the negative integration feature of the GATT is
both its saving grace and its potential downfall. Negative integration is its saving
grace because, as described throughout this article, it limits the WTO's ability to
interfere with domestic sovereignty. It is the GATT's potential downfall because
it does nothing to address the race to the bottom problem and to raise the level of
regulatory protection in the various contracting States. In fact, the GATT defacto
encourages manufacturers to avail themselves of contracting States' regulatory
comparative advantage. In other words, the same reflex that preserves sovereign
States' right to develop good habits preserves their ability to develop bad habits.
The perfect trade world involves full positive integration. In one giant unified
market with one set of regulations, there would be no need to block out foreign
products or to impose any disparate treatment on them. How to achieve positive
integration through an organization that comprises billions of citizens is of course
well beyond the scope of this article. Our limited purpose was to show that,
absent unification or harmonization of the regulatory environment, the negative
integration enterprise can only go so far without imposing an undue burden on
domestic sovereignty. The WTO's task should continue to be, using tools

available to tribunals, ferreting out as much protectionism as possible without
skirting illegitimacy by becoming an instrument of positive integration.
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